goznym is a ransomware operator no longer publishing new disclosures. Darkfield has indexed 1 public victims claimed by this operator between January 1, 2015. Goznym was a banking trojan operation that emerged in January 2015, primarily motivated by financial gain through credential theft and fraudulent banking transactions rather than traditional ransomware deployment. The group is believed to have originated from Eastern Europe, operating as a collaborative criminal enterprise that combined the Gozi ISFB banking trojan with Nymaim malware to create a hybrid threat capable of stealing banking credentials and conducting unauthorized financial transfers. Goznym primarily gained initial access through malicious email campaigns containing infected attachments or links, utilizing sophisticated web injection techniques to steal online banking credentials and conducting man-in-the-browser attacks to facilitate fraudulent transactions, though they were not known to employ traditional double or triple extortion tactics associated with modern ransomware groups. The operation was notably disrupted by a major international law enforcement action in 2019, when the U.S. Department of Justice announced charges against ten individuals associated with the Goznym network, which was responsible for stealing an estimated $100 million from victims across multiple countries, primarily targeting financial institutions and their customers in the United States and other Western nations. The Goznym operation has been largely dormant since the 2019 law enforcement disruption, with key members either arrested or having moved on to other criminal enterprises.
How we know this. Operator profiles on Darkfield are built from continuous monitoring of every leak site the group is known to operate, cross-correlated with community-curated feeds (RansomLook, ransomware.live, RansomWatch, MISP-galaxy). Status flips from active to inactive when no new disclosure appears for 60 days. MITRE ATT&CK mappings shown in the interactive section below are sourced from CISA, vendor analysis, and the MITRE community catalog — we attribute each technique back to its source. Aliases reflect operator re-brands and affiliate splits.