The dunghill ransomware group is a relatively new financially-motivated cybercriminal operation that emerged in April 2023, with documented attacks against 16 victims across multiple countries and sectors. Based on limited public reporting, the group's origin and affiliations remain unclear, though their targeting patterns suggest they operate as an independent entity rather than a established ransomware-as-a-service operation. The group has demonstrated a preference for targeting business services and technology sectors, with attacks documented across the United Kingdom, United States, Brazil, Bolivia, and Taiwan, indicating either a broad opportunistic approach or the use of initial access brokers to expand their geographic reach. While specific technical details about their attack methodology, encryption techniques, and extortion tactics have not been extensively documented in public threat intelligence reports, their multi-country victim distribution suggests they employ common initial access vectors such as phishing, credential theft, or exploitation of internet-facing vulnerabilities. No major high-profile attacks or significant law enforcement actions against the dunghill group have been publicly reported, likely due to their recent emergence and relatively small victim count compared to more established ransomware operations. As of current reporting, the group appears to remain active with limited public visibility into their operations. The group has been linked to 16 public disclosures across our corpus. First observed on a leak site on April 10, 2023; most recent post July 1, 2025. The operation is currently inactive.
Sector and geography
This disclosure adds to ransomware activity in the Business Services sector, which has 3,796 disclosures indexed across all operators we track. Geographically, The Printing House is reported in Canada, a country with 1,055 ransomware disclosures in our corpus.
If your organisation is affected
A listing by dunghill means The Printing House appeared on a ransomware extortion site and data attributed to it has been published. If this is your organisation, or a supplier you depend on, the priority is to confirm the intrusion and contain it before the window to act closes.
- Engage your incident-response team and preserve forensic evidence before remediating — do not wipe affected systems first.
- Force a password reset and revoke active sessions for exposed accounts; rotate any credentials, API keys or certificates that may have been in the stolen data.
- Assess regulatory notification duties (GDPR, NIS2, sector regulators) — many carry a 72-hour reporting clock from awareness.
- Report the incident to your national CERT, CCCS (Canada), as required for your jurisdiction.
- Monitor for the data appearing on dunghill's leak site and across paste and breach channels, and brief downstream partners who may be exposed through you.
How we know this. Darkfield monitors public ransomware leak sites continuously, archiving every new disclosure and the data later released against the victim. Each entry on this page is sourced from the operator's own publication and cross-checked against complementary OSINT feeds (RansomLook, ransomware.live, RansomWatch). We do not collect or host stolen data — only the metadata, timestamps and screenshots needed to make the public disclosure searchable and accountable. Records here are corrected when the original post is edited, retracted, or merged with another disclosure.