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Ransomware victim disclosure

All victims

ZALORA

listed as zalora.sg (Singapore Shopping) · Claimed by Babuk · listed 1 year ago

15m
Age
since listed · data leaked

Status timeline

  1. ListedApr 3, 2025
  2. Data leakeddate unknown

At a glance

Group
Babuk
Status
Data leaked
Country
Singapore
Listed on leak site
Apr 3, 2025

About the victim

AI dossier — public-source company profile

ZALORA is a major online fashion and lifestyle retailer operating across Southeast Asia, headquartered in Singapore. The platform sells clothing, footwear, and accessories from numerous brands to consumers in the region.

Industry
E-commerce & Online Retail Fashion
Employees
1001-5000
Founded
2012

Attack summary

Severity: high — Confirmed data publication by Babuk of a major regional e-commerce platform likely containing customer PII and transaction data at scale; operational impact on a significant public-facing service.

Babuk claims to have breached ZALORA and published exfiltrated data. The group states data has been disclosed, though specific details of what was accessed are not elaborated in the truncated post.

high

Data the group says was taken

AI dossier — extracted from the leak post
  • customer accounts
  • transaction records
  • personal information

What the group claims

zalora.sg (Singapore Shopping)

Sources

Source

Indexed 1 year ago

This page surfaces a public ransomware disclosure indexed by Darkfield. Original posts come from the operator's own leak site; we cross-check against ransomware.live, RansomLook and RansomWatch where applicable. Share this URL freely.

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Disclosure context

About Babuk

Babuk is a ransomware group that emerged in October 2020, operating primarily for financial gain through extortion campaigns targeting organizations across multiple sectors. The group is believed to have originated from Russian-speaking cybercriminal networks and operates independently rather than as a traditional Ransomware-as-a-Service model, though they have shown willingness to collaborate with affiliates. Babuk typically gains initial access through exploitation of unpatched vulnerabilities in public-facing applications and weak remote desktop protocol credentials, employs double extortion tactics by exfiltrating sensitive data before deploying their custom encryption malware, and threatens to publish stolen information on their dedicated leak site if ransom demands are not met. The group gained significant notoriety in May 2021 when they successfully breached the Washington D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, stealing and threatening to release sensitive law enforcement data including information on criminal investigations and police personnel. Following increased law enforcement attention after the police department attack, Babuk announced in May 2021 that they were ceasing ransomware operations and would focus solely on data theft and extortion, though various security researchers have observed continued sporadic activity from the group or actors using similar tools and techniques. The group has been linked to 188 public disclosures across our corpus. First observed on a leak site on October 25, 2020; most recent post April 23, 2025. The operation is currently inactive.

Timeline of this disclosure

  • April 3, 2025zalora.sg (Singapore Shopping) listed by Babukon the group's public leak site

Sector and geography

This disclosure adds to ransomware activity in the Consumer Services sector, which has 829 disclosures indexed across all operators we track. Geographically, zalora.sg (Singapore Shopping) is reported in Singapore, a country with 76 ransomware disclosures in our corpus.

If your organisation is affected

A listing by Babuk means zalora.sg (Singapore Shopping) appeared on a ransomware extortion site and data attributed to it has been published. If this is your organisation, or a supplier you depend on, the priority is to confirm the intrusion and contain it before the window to act closes.

  • Engage your incident-response team and preserve forensic evidence before remediating — do not wipe affected systems first.
  • Force a password reset and revoke active sessions for exposed accounts; rotate any credentials, API keys or certificates that may have been in the stolen data.
  • Assess regulatory notification duties (GDPR, NIS2, sector regulators) — many carry a 72-hour reporting clock from awareness.
  • Report the incident to your national CERT, SingCERT (Singapore), as required for your jurisdiction.
  • Monitor for the data appearing on Babuk's leak site and across paste and breach channels, and brief downstream partners who may be exposed through you.

How we know this. Darkfield monitors public ransomware leak sites continuously, archiving every new disclosure and the data later released against the victim. Each entry on this page is sourced from the operator's own publication and cross-checked against complementary OSINT feeds (RansomLook, ransomware.live, RansomWatch). We do not collect or host stolen data — only the metadata, timestamps and screenshots needed to make the public disclosure searchable and accountable. Records here are corrected when the original post is edited, retracted, or merged with another disclosure.