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Shantou Huashan Electronic Devices Co., Ltd.

listed as huashan.com.cn · Claimed by Krybit · listed 3 months ago

2m
Age
since listed · data leaked

Status timeline

  1. ListedJun 6, 2026
  2. Data leakeddate unknown

At a glance

Group
Krybit
Status
Data leaked
Country
China
Listed on leak site
Jun 6, 2026

About the victim

AI dossier — public-source company profile

Shantou Huashan Electronic Devices Co., Ltd. (SHEDCL) is a Chinese semiconductor and electronic components manufacturer founded in 1983, headquartered in Shantou, Guangdong Province. The company produces voltage regulators, transistors, diodes, capacitors, inductors, and resistors, supplying major brands including Samsung, Philips, TCL, and Skyworth. It operates across 20,000 m² with ISO9001, ISO14001, and IATF16949 certifications.

Industry
Semiconductor Manufacturing & Electronic Components
Address
No. 27 Xingye Road, Shantou, Guangdong, China — 515041
Founded
1983

Attack summary

Severity: medium — Data has been published by the threat actor (disclosed_status: data_published), indicating confirmed exfiltration. However, the leak post provides no specific inventory of data types, no proof files/screenshots, and no detail on scope. The company handles manufacturing and supply-chain data; without explicit confirmation of PII, financial records, or trade secrets, severity is rated medium.

The Krybit group claims to have accessed and published data from Shantou Huashan Electronic Devices Co., Ltd. The leak post does not explicitly state whether encryption, exfiltration, or both occurred, nor does it detail what specific data categories were compromised.

medium

What the group claims

Shantou Huashan Electronic Devices Co., Ltd. (SHEDCL) is a Chinese manufacturer of semiconductor devices and electronic ...

The leak post

captured from the group's site
Shantou Huashan Electronic Devices Co., Ltd. (SHEDCL) is a Chinese manufacturer of semiconductor devices and electronic components, founded on November 15, 1983, and headquartered in Shantou, Guangdong Province, China. The company specializes in the production and distribution of voltage regulators, digital transistors, general transistors, Schottky diodes, wafers, capacitors, inductors, and resistors. SHEDCL covers an area of 20,000 m², of which 12,000 m² is dedicated to plant buildings. The company has carried out OEM cooperation with internationally renowned semiconductor companies including Samsung, Fairchild, Philips Semiconductors, AOS, Vishay, NXP, and Renesas, and has been a supplier to Skyworth, TCL, Great Wall, Philips Lighting, EAST, GoldenField, and Schumacher since 1993. The company holds ISO9001, ISO14001, and IATF16949 certifications, and has been accredited as a "Green Partner" by Sony. SHEDCL markets its products worldwide.
No. 27 Xingye Road, Shantou, Guangdong, China — Post: 515041

Sources

Source

Indexed 3 months ago

This page surfaces a public ransomware disclosure indexed by Darkfield. Original posts come from the operator's own leak site; we cross-check against ransomware.live, RansomLook and RansomWatch where applicable. Share this URL freely.

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Disclosure context

About krybit

Krybit is an emerging ransomware group that was first observed in April 2026, operating with apparent financial motivations based on their limited documented attacks against diverse sectors. The group's origin and affiliations remain unclear due to limited public intelligence, and it is unknown whether they operate as a Ransomware-as-a-Service model or as an independent entity. With only four known victims documented across geographically diverse regions including Mexico, Austria, Japan, and Botswana, the group appears to employ broad targeting rather than focused regional or sector-specific campaigns, though their attack methodology, encryption techniques, and data exfiltration practices have not been publicly documented by major security firms or law enforcement agencies. No notable high-profile campaigns or significant ransoms have been publicly reported, and no law enforcement actions against the group have been documented. Given the recent emergence of this group and extremely limited public reporting, Krybit's current operational status and capabilities remain largely unknown to the broader cybersecurity community. The group has been linked to 107 public disclosures across our corpus. First observed on a leak site on April 3, 2026; most recent post August 24, 2026. The operation is currently active.

Timeline of this disclosure

  • June 6, 2026huashan.com.cn listed by krybiton the group's public leak site

Other recent disclosures by krybit

krybit has been linked to 107 public victims on Darkfield. A sample of the most recent:

See the full krybit dossier →

Sector and geography

Geographically, huashan.com.cn is reported in China, a country with 45 ransomware disclosures in our corpus.

If your organisation is affected

A listing by krybit means huashan.com.cn appeared on a ransomware extortion site and data attributed to it has been published. If this is your organisation, or a supplier you depend on, the priority is to confirm the intrusion and contain it before the window to act closes.

  • Engage your incident-response team and preserve forensic evidence before remediating — do not wipe affected systems first.
  • Force a password reset and revoke active sessions for exposed accounts; rotate any credentials, API keys or certificates that may have been in the stolen data.
  • Assess regulatory notification duties (GDPR, NIS2, sector regulators) — many carry a 72-hour reporting clock from awareness.
  • Monitor for the data appearing on krybit's leak site and across paste and breach channels, and brief downstream partners who may be exposed through you.

How we know this. Darkfield monitors public ransomware leak sites continuously, archiving every new disclosure and the data later released against the victim. Each entry on this page is sourced from the operator's own publication and cross-checked against complementary OSINT feeds (RansomLook, ransomware.live, RansomWatch). We do not collect or host stolen data — only the metadata, timestamps and screenshots needed to make the public disclosure searchable and accountable. Records here are corrected when the original post is edited, retracted, or merged with another disclosure.