Skip to main content
Darkfield

Ransomware victim disclosure

← All victims

Profinergy BV

listed as profinrg.nl · Claimed by Settra · listed 7 days ago

6d
Age
since listed · data leaked

Status timeline

  1. ListedAug 11, 2026
  2. Data leakeddate unknown

At a glance

Group
Settra
Status
Data leaked
Country
Netherlands
Sector
Professional Services
Listed on leak site
Aug 11, 2026

About the victim

AI dossier — public-source company profile

Profinergy BV (operating as ProfiNRG) is a Dutch renewable energy project developer and engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) contractor specializing in design, construction, and operation of utility-scale solar power plants across Europe. Headquartered in Utrecht, the company operates through a network of specialized legal entities and dedicated special purpose vehicles (SPVs) for individual solar farm projects, with consolidated group assets of approximately €35 million.

Industry
Renewable Energy Development & Solar EPC Contracting
Address
Maarssenbroeksedijk 37, 3542 DM Utrecht, Netherlands

Attack summary

Severity: critical — Confirmed exfiltration of multiple categories of highly sensitive regulated and proprietary data: (1) consolidated financial statements and banking details of regulated energy sector company; (2) personal customer data at scale (names, addresses, phone numbers, banking account details); (3) employee personal records including work authorization status; (4) confidential NDA-marked commercial contracts with third parties (Tesla); (5) financing agreements with government bank and critical infrastru

The Settra group claims to have exfiltrated thousands of files from an unprotected archive belonging to Profinergy, including consolidated financial statements, confidential Tesla Energy commercial proposals (€5.1–6.4 million energy storage contracts), BNG Bank financing documents, power purchase agreements, technical manuals from third parties (Ciel & Terre, AXIAL), insurance policies, court litigation records, personal customer and employee data, and supplier chain information.

critical

Data the group says was taken

AI dossier — extracted from the leak post
  • Consolidated financial statements (€35M+ assets)
  • Tesla Megapack NDA commercial proposals
  • BNG Bank credit agreements and terms
  • Power Purchase Agreements (IJsselmeerdijk, others)
  • Insurance policies with coverage amounts
  • Third-party technical manuals (Ciel & Terre, AXIAL, Liander)
  • Court case files (Astronergy Solar lawsuit 2018)
  • Customer accounts receivable with names, addresses, phone numbers
  • Employee correspondence with banking details
  • Personal customer invoices with full addresses and equipment specs
  • Employee work authorization/visa status documents
  • JA Solar supplier agreements and procurement pricing
  • Huawei inverter and monitoring system credentials (default passwords)
  • Project drawings and permits
  • Supply chain and vendor relationships

What the group claims

How Profinergy BV Lost Control of Thousands of Files PROLOGUE: Thousands of files. The complete digi...

The leak post

captured from the group's site
# How Profinergy BV Lost Control of Thousands of Files
**Thousands of files. The complete digital archive of a group of companies building solar power plants across Europe.** Consolidated financial statements totaling over . A Tesla Energy commercial proposal — marked **"Proprietary & Confidential | Disclosed under NDA"** — with three pricing options for Megapack energy storage systems with a combined value ranging from . Credit documents for a solar farm financed by BNG Bank. A power purchase agreement with . Insurance policies with exact coverage amounts. Confidential supplier technical manuals marked . Court documents from a lawsuit against Profinergy — a summons seeking a penalty of . Personal customer data: names, addresses, phone numbers, and banking details for payments. A letter confirming "highly skilled migrant" status — an employee record complete with work authorization.
All of it — in a single unprotected archive belonging to (trade name ), a Dutch solar energy developer and EPC contractor headquartered in Utrecht.
_This article presents only a portion of the data we have chosen to disclose. The rest will be available for download and review following publication of th…

Sources

Source

Indexed 7 days ago

This page surfaces a public ransomware disclosure indexed by Darkfield. Original posts come from the operator's own leak site; we cross-check against ransomware.live, RansomLook and RansomWatch where applicable. Share this URL freely.

Is this your supplier? Your competitor? You?

Pro plans monitor your domain, corporate emails, and crypto wallets across every new ransomware leak-site post, breach dump and Telegram callout — alerts within 5 minutes.

Disclosure context

About settra

Settra is a ransomware group first observed in June 2026 with an apparent primary motivation of financial gain, having claimed at least 11 victims within a relatively short operational window. Given the recency of their emergence and limited public documentation from major threat intelligence sources such as CISA, FBI, or Mandiant at this time, detailed technical attribution remains unconfirmed. Their targeting pattern shows a geographic concentration in the United States, Taiwan, Portugal, Singapore, and Canada, suggesting an opportunistic rather than narrowly focused regional strategy. Affected sectors include Consumer Services, Manufacturing, Transportation and Logistics, and Agriculture and Food Production, indicating the group does not restrict itself to a single vertical and likely prioritizes target accessibility over sector-specific expertise. No publicly documented information is currently available to confirm their country of origin, RaaS affiliation, specific initial access vectors, encryption methodology, or extortion tactics, and no major law enforcement actions against the group have been publicly reported as of this writing. Given their nascent operational timeline and limited victim count, Settra should be considered an emerging threat actor warranting continued monitoring as their tactics, techniques, and procedures become better characterized through future incident reporting and threat intelligence disclosures. The group has been linked to 40 public disclosures across our corpus. First observed on a leak site on June 28, 2026; most recent post August 16, 2026. The operation is currently active.

Timeline of this disclosure

  • August 11, 2026profinrg.nl listed by settraon the group's public leak site

Other recent disclosures by settra

settra has been linked to 40 public victims on Darkfield. A sample of the most recent:

See the full settra dossier →

Sector and geography

This disclosure adds to ransomware activity in the Professional Services sector, which has 14 disclosures indexed across all operators we track. Geographically, profinrg.nl is reported in Netherlands, a country with 42 ransomware disclosures in our corpus.

If your organisation is affected

A listing by settra means profinrg.nl appeared on a ransomware extortion site and data attributed to it has been published. If this is your organisation, or a supplier you depend on, the priority is to confirm the intrusion and contain it before the window to act closes.

  • Engage your incident-response team and preserve forensic evidence before remediating — do not wipe affected systems first.
  • Force a password reset and revoke active sessions for exposed accounts; rotate any credentials, API keys or certificates that may have been in the stolen data.
  • Assess regulatory notification duties (GDPR, NIS2, sector regulators) — many carry a 72-hour reporting clock from awareness.
  • Report the incident to your national CERT, NCSC-NL (Netherlands), as required for your jurisdiction.
  • Monitor for the data appearing on settra's leak site and across paste and breach channels, and brief downstream partners who may be exposed through you.

How we know this. Darkfield monitors public ransomware leak sites continuously, archiving every new disclosure and the data later released against the victim. Each entry on this page is sourced from the operator's own publication and cross-checked against complementary OSINT feeds (RansomLook, ransomware.live, RansomWatch). We do not collect or host stolen data — only the metadata, timestamps and screenshots needed to make the public disclosure searchable and accountable. Records here are corrected when the original post is edited, retracted, or merged with another disclosure.