Was nicatel.com.uy hit by ransomware?

nicatel.com.uy was listed by the lockbit3 ransomware operation (Uruguay), and stolen data was published on the group's leak site. Darkfield tracks this disclosure with the original leak post, screenshot and group context.

Who is the lockbit3 ransomware group?

lockbit3 is a ransomware operator tracked by Darkfield. See the full operator dossier for its known victims, sectors targeted, IOCs and leak-site infrastructure.

What data was leaked in the nicatel.com.uy breach?

lockbit3 published data attributed to nicatel.com.uy. Darkfield captured the leak post and a screenshot of the listing.

Ransomware victim disclosure

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NICATEL S.A.

listed as nicatel.com.uy · Claimed by Lockbit3 · listed 1 year ago

17m

Age

since listed · data leaked

Status timeline

ListedJan 13, 2025
Data leakeddate unknown

At a glance

Group: Lockbit3
Status: Data leaked
Country: Uruguay
Sector: Business Services
Listed on leak site: Jan 13, 2025

About the victim

AI dossier — public-source company profile

NICATEL S.A. is a Uruguayan distributor and retailer of Samsung mobile phones and accessories since 2007, and Havit products since 2018. The company operates multiple Samsung Experience Stores and retail locations across Uruguay, including flagship locations in Montevideo, Punta del Este, and Ciudad de la Costa.

Industry: Consumer Electronics Distribution & Retail
Address: Canelones 2001, 11200 Montevideo, Departamento de Montevideo, Uruguay
Founded: 2007

Attack summary

Severity: low — Victim listing and announcement with no proof files, screenshots, or operational impact described. No details provided on data exfiltration or encryption impact.

Lockbit3 claims to have attacked NICATEL S.A. and posted the victim on their leak site. The group's post does not specify whether data was exfiltrated, encrypted, or both, nor does it detail what data is at stake.

low

What the group claims

Greetings! Today we are posting here the new company, "NICATEL S.A.". Company Description: NICATEL has been the official distributor of Samsung mobile phones and accessories since 2007 and Havit since 2018. Headquarters: 2001 Canelones, Mont...

Sources

Victim sitenicatel.com.uy
Leak posthttp://lockbit3753ekiocyo5epmpy6klmejchjtzddoekjlnt6mu3qh4de2id.onion/post/6l5LBk0igigoQqnh678575d21f824

Source

Indexed 1 year ago

This page surfaces a public ransomware disclosure indexed by Darkfield. Original posts come from the operator's own leak site; we cross-check against ransomware.live, RansomLook and RansomWatch where applicable. Share this URL freely.

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Disclosure context

About lockbit3

LockBit 3.0, also known as LockBit Black, is a prominent ransomware-as-a-service operation that emerged in June 2022 as the third major iteration of the LockBit ransomware family, operating with primarily financial motivations and becoming one of the most prolific ransomware groups globally. The group is believed to operate from Russia or former Soviet states, functioning as a sophisticated RaaS platform that recruits affiliates to conduct attacks while the core group maintains the ransomware infrastructure and negotiates with victims. LockBit 3.0 employs multiple initial access vectors including exploitation of remote desktop protocols, vulnerable VPN appliances, and phishing campaigns, utilizing a fast-encrypting ransomware payload that can complete network-wide encryption in minutes while implementing triple extortion tactics that include data theft, encryption, and threats to leak stolen information on their dedicated leak site called "LockBit Black Blog." The group has claimed responsibility for attacks against thousands of organizations worldwide, with notable victims including major corporations and critical infrastructure entities across their primary target countries of the United States, France, United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy, focusing heavily on business services, technology, manufacturing, healthcare, and government sectors. Despite law enforcement disruptions including Operation Cronos in February 2024 which temporarily seized their infrastructure and websites, LockBit has demonstrated resilience by quickly rebuilding their operations and continuing to recruit new affiliates and victims. The group has been linked to 2,016 public disclosures across our corpus. First observed on a leak site on June 29, 2022; most recent post December 5, 2025. The operation is currently active.

Timeline of this disclosure

January 13, 2025nicatel.com.uy listed by lockbit3on the group's public leak site

Other recent disclosures by lockbit3

lockbit3 has been linked to 2,016 public victims on Darkfield. A sample of the most recent:

See the full lockbit3 dossier →

Sector and geography

This disclosure adds to ransomware activity in the Business Services sector, which has 3,796 disclosures indexed across all operators we track. Geographically, nicatel.com.uy is reported in Uruguay.

If your organisation is affected

A listing by lockbit3 means nicatel.com.uy appeared on a ransomware extortion site and data attributed to it has been published. If this is your organisation, or a supplier you depend on, the priority is to confirm the intrusion and contain it before the window to act closes.

Engage your incident-response team and preserve forensic evidence before remediating — do not wipe affected systems first.
Force a password reset and revoke active sessions for exposed accounts; rotate any credentials, API keys or certificates that may have been in the stolen data.
Assess regulatory notification duties (GDPR, NIS2, sector regulators) — many carry a 72-hour reporting clock from awareness.
Monitor for the data appearing on lockbit3's leak site and across paste and breach channels, and brief downstream partners who may be exposed through you.

How we know this. Darkfield monitors public ransomware leak sites continuously, archiving every new disclosure and the data later released against the victim. Each entry on this page is sourced from the operator's own publication and cross-checked against complementary OSINT feeds (RansomLook, ransomware.live, RansomWatch). We do not collect or host stolen data — only the metadata, timestamps and screenshots needed to make the public disclosure searchable and accountable. Records here are corrected when the original post is edited, retracted, or merged with another disclosure.