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Ransomware victim disclosure

All victims

Ciclo Cairu

Claimed by Sarcoma · listed 1 year ago

15m
Age
since listed · data leaked

Status timeline

  1. ListedMar 22, 2025
  2. Data leakeddate unknown

At a glance

Group
Sarcoma
Status
Data leaked
Country
Brazil
Listed on leak site
Mar 22, 2025

About the victim

AI dossier — public-source company profile

Ciclo Cairu is a Brazilian manufacturer and distributor of bicycle and motorcycle parts, founded in 1985 in Pimenta Bueno, Rondônia. The company evolved from a small retail bicycle workshop to a wholesale supplier and importer of parts from Asia, and later began assembling bicycles domestically in 1992. By the late 1990s, it had expanded into motorcycle tire distribution and parts sales.

Industry
Bicycle & Motorcycle Parts Manufacturing & Distribution
Address
Pimenta Bueno, Rondônia, Brazil
Founded
1985

Attack summary

Severity: low — Post contains only company background history with no disclosure of specific data types, proof files, or operational impact. No evidence of exfiltration or encryption claims in the truncated excerpt.

The Sarcoma group claims to have compromised Ciclo Cairu and published data. No specific details on encryption, exfiltration method, or data categories are provided in the available excerpt.

low

What the group claims

Ciclo Cairu began its activities in 1985 in the city of Pimenta Bueno, Rondônia, selling bicycle parts, repairs and renovations at retail. A small bicycle workshop like many that can be seen in every city. Almost two years later, taking advantage of the great lack of parts suppliers in the replacement market, its owners decided to enter the wholesale bicycle parts sales business, initially supplying other small traders in the sector in nearby cities, an activity that, conducted with a lot of work, seriousness and respect for customers, was very successful and developed rapidly, reaching the entire state and also other neighboring states. The years passed and the company discovered new horizons, with the growing demand and the lack of suppliers in the domestic market, combined with the opening of the market to imports, in 1990 the company began importing products, which brought a significant reduction in the costs of the goods sold, as the products were brought directly from countries such as China, India and Taiwan, countries that are world leaders in the production of bicycles and parts. In 1992, bicycle production in Brazil was only carried out by two large assemblers that divided the national market between themselves. Seeing the need for other options, Ciclo Cairu decided to enter the bicycle assembly market. The company, which at the time had all the components necessary for assembling bicycles, began to assemble single-speed and geared mountain bikes, always assembled with top-of-the-line components. They were very well received, competing on equal terms with other national and imported brands. In 1997, motivated by the Pirelli tire industry, which until then did not have a motorcycle tire distributor in the North region, the company took on yet another challenge of bringing that brand's tires to motorcycle stores and workshops. Knowing the segment, it realized the market opportunity for distributing motorcycle parts, and began selling motorcycle parts from se

Sources

Source

Indexed 1 year ago

This page surfaces a public ransomware disclosure indexed by Darkfield. Original posts come from the operator's own leak site; we cross-check against ransomware.live, RansomLook and RansomWatch where applicable. Share this URL freely.

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Disclosure context

About Sarcoma

Sarcoma is a relatively new ransomware group that emerged in October 2024, operating with apparent financial motivations and demonstrating a broad international targeting approach with at least 140 documented victims across multiple countries and industry sectors. The group's origin and affiliations remain unclear due to its recent emergence, with no publicly documented connections to established ransomware families or confirmation of whether they operate as an independent entity or through a Ransomware-as-a-Service model. Limited public information is available regarding Sarcoma's specific attack methodologies, initial access vectors, or technical capabilities, though their targeting patterns suggest opportunistic rather than highly selective victim selection across diverse industries including manufacturing, business services, agriculture and food production, and technology sectors. The group has shown a particular focus on victims in the United States while also maintaining operations against targets in Italy, Canada, Germany, and Australia, though no specific high-profile attacks or record ransom demands have been publicly documented by major security firms or law enforcement agencies. Given the group's recent emergence in late 2024, Sarcoma appears to remain active with no reported law enforcement disruptions or confirmed rebranding activities at this time. The group has been linked to 150 public disclosures across our corpus. First observed on a leak site on October 9, 2024; most recent post May 12, 2026. The operation is currently active.

Also tracked as: Sarcoma Ransomware Group.

Timeline of this disclosure

  • March 22, 2025Ciclo Cairu listed by Sarcomaon the group's public leak site

Sector and geography

This disclosure adds to ransomware activity in the Manufacturing sector, which has 3,681 disclosures indexed across all operators we track. Geographically, Ciclo Cairu is reported in Brazil, a country with 404 ransomware disclosures in our corpus.

If your organisation is affected

A listing by Sarcoma means Ciclo Cairu appeared on a ransomware extortion site and data attributed to it has been published. If this is your organisation, or a supplier you depend on, the priority is to confirm the intrusion and contain it before the window to act closes.

  • Engage your incident-response team and preserve forensic evidence before remediating — do not wipe affected systems first.
  • Force a password reset and revoke active sessions for exposed accounts; rotate any credentials, API keys or certificates that may have been in the stolen data.
  • Assess regulatory notification duties (GDPR, NIS2, sector regulators) — many carry a 72-hour reporting clock from awareness.
  • Report the incident to your national CERT, CERT.br (Brazil), as required for your jurisdiction.
  • Monitor for the data appearing on Sarcoma's leak site and across paste and breach channels, and brief downstream partners who may be exposed through you.

How we know this. Darkfield monitors public ransomware leak sites continuously, archiving every new disclosure and the data later released against the victim. Each entry on this page is sourced from the operator's own publication and cross-checked against complementary OSINT feeds (RansomLook, ransomware.live, RansomWatch). We do not collect or host stolen data — only the metadata, timestamps and screenshots needed to make the public disclosure searchable and accountable. Records here are corrected when the original post is edited, retracted, or merged with another disclosure.