Triad Packaging

About sicarii

The Sicarii ransomware group is an emerging threat actor that first appeared in January 2026, operating with apparent financial motivations based on their ransomware deployment activities. Limited public documentation exists regarding this group's origin or potential affiliations, though their operational patterns suggest they may be operating independently rather than as part of an established ransomware-as-a-service ecosystem. The group's attack methodology remains largely undocumented by major security firms and government agencies, with insufficient public reporting to establish their preferred initial access vectors, encryption techniques, or whether they employ data exfiltration tactics commonly seen in double or triple extortion schemes. Their targeting appears focused primarily on the United States manufacturing sector, though with only one documented victim as of current reporting, their campaign scope and impact remain minimal compared to established ransomware operations. The group's current operational status suggests they are either newly active or operating at a very limited scale, with no significant law enforcement actions or major security researcher attention documented in public threat intelligence reporting. The group has been linked to 1 public disclosures across our corpus. First observed on a leak site on January 5, 2026. The operation is currently active.

Timeline of this disclosure

• January 5, 2026Triad Packaging listed by sicariion the group's public leak site

Sector and geography

This disclosure adds to ransomware activity in the Manufacturing sector, which has 3,681 disclosures indexed across all operators we track. Geographically, Triad Packaging is reported in United States, a country with 11,033 ransomware disclosures in our corpus.

If your organisation is affected

A listing by sicarii means Triad Packaging appeared on a ransomware extortion site and data attributed to it has been published. If this is your organisation, or a supplier you depend on, the priority is to confirm the intrusion and contain it before the window to act closes.

• Engage your incident-response team and preserve forensic evidence before remediating — do not wipe affected systems first.
• Force a password reset and revoke active sessions for exposed accounts; rotate any credentials, API keys or certificates that may have been in the stolen data.
• Assess regulatory notification duties (GDPR, NIS2, sector regulators) — many carry a 72-hour reporting clock from awareness.
• Report the incident to your national CERT, CISA (United States), as required for your jurisdiction.
• Monitor for the data appearing on sicarii's leak site and across paste and breach channels, and brief downstream partners who may be exposed through you.