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Ransomware victim disclosure

All victims

City of Cartersville

Claimed by Ryuk · listed 7 years ago

87m
Age
since listed · data leaked

Status timeline

  1. ListedMay 4, 2019
  2. Data leakeddate unknown

At a glance

Group
Ryuk
Status
Data leaked
Listed on leak site
May 4, 2019

Source

Indexed 7 years ago

This page surfaces a public ransomware disclosure indexed by Darkfield. Original posts come from the operator's own leak site; we cross-check against ransomware.live, RansomLook and RansomWatch where applicable. Share this URL freely.

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Disclosure context

About ryuk

**Overview:** Ryuk is a prominent ransomware operation that emerged in October 2018, primarily motivated by financial gain through high-value targeted attacks against enterprise networks. The group became one of the most destructive ransomware families, focusing on large organizations capable of paying substantial ransoms rather than conducting widespread automated campaigns. **Origin & Affiliation:** Ryuk is believed to have origins tied to Russian-speaking cybercriminals and has been linked to the North Korean state-sponsored group Lazarus, though it operates primarily as an independent financially-motivated enterprise. The group has been associated with the TrickBot botnet infrastructure and has collaborated with various initial access brokers rather than operating as a traditional RaaS model. **Attack Methodology:** Ryuk typically gains initial access through spear-phishing campaigns, exploitation of Remote Desktop Protocol vulnerabilities, or by purchasing access from other cybercriminal groups operating banking trojans like TrickBot and Emotet. The operators conduct extensive network reconnaissance using tools like Cobalt Strike, PowerShell Empire, and AdFind before deploying ransomware, often disabling security software and deleting backups. While primarily focused on encryption for ransom, later campaigns incorporated data exfiltration threats as part of double extortion tactics. **Notable Campaigns:** Ryuk has been responsible for major attacks against numerous high-profile targets including multiple hospitals and healthcare systems, causing significant operational disruptions, and has targeted critical infrastructure sectors including municipal governments and educational institutions. The group has demanded ransoms ranging from hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars, with some of the highest recorded payouts in ransomware history. **Current Status:** Ryuk operations significantly declined following law enforcement disruptions of associated infrastructure like TrickBot in late 2020 and 2021, with many security researchers considering the original Ryuk group largely inactive, though some variants and successors have emerged under different names. The group has been linked to 48 public disclosures across our corpus. First observed on a leak site on October 4, 2018; most recent post May 18, 2021. The operation is currently inactive.

Timeline of this disclosure

  • May 4, 2019City of Cartersville listed by ryukon the group's public leak site

Sector and geography

This disclosure adds to ransomware activity in the Government Facilities sector, which has 88 disclosures indexed across all operators we track. Geographically, City of Cartersville is reported in United States, a country with 11,033 ransomware disclosures in our corpus.

If your organisation is affected

A listing by ryuk means City of Cartersville appeared on a ransomware extortion site and data attributed to it has been published. If this is your organisation, or a supplier you depend on, the priority is to confirm the intrusion and contain it before the window to act closes.

  • Engage your incident-response team and preserve forensic evidence before remediating — do not wipe affected systems first.
  • Force a password reset and revoke active sessions for exposed accounts; rotate any credentials, API keys or certificates that may have been in the stolen data.
  • Assess regulatory notification duties (GDPR, NIS2, sector regulators) — many carry a 72-hour reporting clock from awareness.
  • Report the incident to your national CERT, CISA (United States), as required for your jurisdiction.
  • Monitor for the data appearing on ryuk's leak site and across paste and breach channels, and brief downstream partners who may be exposed through you.

How we know this. Darkfield monitors public ransomware leak sites continuously, archiving every new disclosure and the data later released against the victim. Each entry on this page is sourced from the operator's own publication and cross-checked against complementary OSINT feeds (RansomLook, ransomware.live, RansomWatch). We do not collect or host stolen data — only the metadata, timestamps and screenshots needed to make the public disclosure searchable and accountable. Records here are corrected when the original post is edited, retracted, or merged with another disclosure.