APT73 is a recently emerged ransomware group that began operations in April 2024, with financial motivation as their primary driver based on their targeting patterns across multiple high-value sectors. The group has demonstrated rapid growth in their operational tempo, accumulating 78 documented victims within their first months of activity. Their targeting methodology shows a preference for English-speaking markets and major economies, with the United Kingdom and United States representing their primary focus areas, followed by significant activity in India, Brazil, and France. The group exhibits a clear preference for high-value sectors including business services, technology, financial services, and healthcare organizations, suggesting a calculated approach to victim selection based on potential payment capability and operational impact. Given the group's recent emergence and limited public documentation from major threat intelligence sources, specific details regarding their initial access vectors, tooling, encryption methods, or organizational structure remain largely unconfirmed by authoritative sources such as CISA, FBI, or established security research firms. The group's current operational status appears active based on the timeline of their emergence, though comprehensive analysis of their capabilities and infrastructure requires additional intelligence gathering and documentation by security researchers. The group has been linked to 141 public disclosures across our corpus. First observed on a leak site on April 22, 2024; most recent post April 27, 2026. The operation is currently inactive.
Also tracked as: Eraleign.
Sector and geography
This disclosure adds to ransomware activity in the Financial sector, which has 333 disclosures indexed across all operators we track. Geographically, federalbank.co.in is reported in India, a country with 255 ransomware disclosures in our corpus.
How we know this. Darkfield monitors public ransomware leak sites continuously, archiving every new disclosure and the data later released against the victim. Each entry on this page is sourced from the operator's own publication and cross-checked against complementary OSINT feeds (RansomLook, ransomware.live, RansomWatch). We do not collect or host stolen data — only the metadata, timestamps and screenshots needed to make the public disclosure searchable and accountable. Records here are corrected when the original post is edited, retracted, or merged with another disclosure.
