The Green Blood Group is a ransomware threat actor first observed in February 2026 with an apparent financial motivation, having claimed responsibility for attacks against a very limited number of victims to date. As of the time of this writing, no reputable threat intelligence sources including CISA, FBI, Mandiant, or comparable research organizations have published detailed technical attribution or comprehensive operational profiles for this group, indicating it remains an emerging and obscure actor in the ransomware landscape. Based on available victim data, the group has targeted organizations in Egypt and Senegal, with a focus on the manufacturing and public sector verticals, suggesting a possible interest in operationally critical or government-adjacent targets in the African region. With only two known victims documented, the group's attack methodology, tooling, initial access vectors, encryption implementation, and extortion tactics remain largely uncharacterized in open-source intelligence, and it is unclear whether the group operates as a Ransomware-as-a-Service platform or functions as a closed, independent operation. Given its recent emergence and low victim count, The Green Blood Group should be monitored as a developing threat, particularly by organizations operating in manufacturing and public sector roles across North and West Africa, though definitive technical indicators and behavioral patterns await further documentation by the security research community. The group has been linked to 2 public disclosures across our corpus. First observed on a leak site on February 4, 2026. The operation is currently active.
Sector and geography
This disclosure adds to ransomware activity in the Manufacturing sector, which has 3,684 disclosures indexed across all operators we track. Geographically, ECOBAT EGYPT is reported in Egypt, a country with 29 ransomware disclosures in our corpus.
If your organisation is affected
A listing by The Green Blood Group means ECOBAT EGYPT appeared on a ransomware extortion site and data attributed to it has been published. If this is your organisation, or a supplier you depend on, the priority is to confirm the intrusion and contain it before the window to act closes.
- Engage your incident-response team and preserve forensic evidence before remediating — do not wipe affected systems first.
- Force a password reset and revoke active sessions for exposed accounts; rotate any credentials, API keys or certificates that may have been in the stolen data.
- Assess regulatory notification duties (GDPR, NIS2, sector regulators) — many carry a 72-hour reporting clock from awareness.
- Monitor for the data appearing on The Green Blood Group's leak site and across paste and breach channels, and brief downstream partners who may be exposed through you.
How we know this. Darkfield monitors public ransomware leak sites continuously, archiving every new disclosure and the data later released against the victim. Each entry on this page is sourced from the operator's own publication and cross-checked against complementary OSINT feeds (RansomLook, ransomware.live, RansomWatch). We do not collect or host stolen data — only the metadata, timestamps and screenshots needed to make the public disclosure searchable and accountable. Records here are corrected when the original post is edited, retracted, or merged with another disclosure.
