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Stücheli Architekten AG

listed as stuecheli.ch · Claimed by Safepay · listed 12 hours ago

Today
Age
since listed · data leaked

Status timeline

  1. ListedOct 5, 2026
  2. Data leakeddate unknown

At a glance

Group
Safepay
Status
Data leaked
Listed on leak site
Oct 5, 2026

About the victim

AI dossier — public-source company profile

Stücheli Architekten AG is a third-generation Swiss architecture practice founded in 1946 and headquartered in Zürich. The firm has completed over 2,300 projects and provides comprehensive services from conceptual design through construction documentation and project management, often acting as general planner for complex multi-disciplinary projects.

Industry
Architecture & Design Services
Address
Zürich, Switzerland
Founded
1946

Attack summary

Severity: low — Post is an announcement with no proof files, no specific data categories disclosed, no operational disruption stated, and no evidence yet published. Claims lack substantiation.

The threat actor claims to have compromised Stücheli Architekten AG. The post does not specify whether data was exfiltrated, encrypted, or both, nor does it detail what categories of data are at stake. The statement 'The link will be added soon' suggests evidence publication is pending.

low

What the group claims

The firm was founded by architect Werner Stücheli in 1946 and has developed into a third-generation architectural practice. It is …

The leak post

captured from the group's site
Stücheli Architekten AG is a long-established Swiss architecture practice headquartered in Zürich.
The firm was founded by architect Werner Stücheli in 1946 and has developed into a third-generation architectural practice. It is particularly associated with Zürich's architectural heritage, including the Zur Bastei office building, recognized as the first high-rise building in Zürich's city center. The company has completed more than 2,300 projects throughout its history.The firm's activities cover all phases of construction projects, from initial architectural concepts and competitions through detailed planning, construction documentation and project execution. Stücheli also operates as a general planner, taking responsibility for coordinating complex projects involving large teams of architects, engineers and specialist planners. Its philosophy combines architectural innovation with long-term functionality and consideration of the social and urban environment.
The link will be added soon.

Sources

Source

Indexed 12 hours ago

This page surfaces a public ransomware disclosure indexed by Darkfield. Original posts come from the operator's own leak site; we cross-check against ransomware.live, RansomLook and RansomWatch where applicable. Share this URL freely.

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Disclosure context

About safepay

The Safepay ransomware group is a newly emerged threat actor first observed in November 2024, demonstrating rapid operational scale with 444 documented victims in a short timeframe, indicating financially motivated cybercriminal activity. Due to the group's recent emergence, publicly documented information about their country of origin, affiliations, and operational model remains limited among established threat intelligence sources. Given the recency of their appearance and lack of detailed technical analysis from major security firms, their specific attack methodologies, initial access vectors, and encryption techniques have not been comprehensively documented in public threat intelligence reporting. The group has demonstrated a broad targeting approach across multiple sectors including manufacturing, technology, education, and healthcare, with primary focus on victims in the United States, Germany, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia, though no specific high-profile campaigns or notable incidents have been publicly attributed to them by major security vendors or law enforcement agencies. As of the latest available intelligence, Safepay appears to remain active, though comprehensive threat profiling is limited due to the group's recent emergence and the current lack of detailed technical analysis from established cybersecurity research organizations. The group has been linked to 872 public disclosures across our corpus. First observed on a leak site on November 19, 2024; most recent post October 6, 2026. The operation is currently active.

Timeline of this disclosure

  • October 5, 2026stuecheli.ch listed by safepay on the group's public leak site

Sector and geography

This disclosure adds to ransomware activity in the Retail & E-Commerce sector, which has 21 disclosures indexed across all operators we track. Geographically, stuecheli.ch is reported in Switzerland, a country with 39 ransomware disclosures in our corpus.

If your organisation is affected

A listing by safepay means stuecheli.ch appeared on a ransomware extortion site and data attributed to it has been published. If this is your organisation, or a supplier you depend on, the priority is to confirm the intrusion and contain it before the window to act closes.

  • Engage your incident-response team and preserve forensic evidence before remediating — do not wipe affected systems first.
  • Force a password reset and revoke active sessions for exposed accounts; rotate any credentials, API keys or certificates that may have been in the stolen data.
  • Assess regulatory notification duties (GDPR, NIS2, sector regulators) — many carry a 72-hour reporting clock from awareness.
  • Report the incident to your national CERT, NCSC-CH (Switzerland), as required for your jurisdiction.
  • Monitor for the data appearing on safepay's leak site and across paste and breach channels, and brief downstream partners who may be exposed through you.

How we know this. Darkfield monitors public ransomware leak sites continuously, archiving every new disclosure and the data later released against the victim. Each entry on this page is sourced from the operator's own publication and cross-checked against complementary OSINT feeds (RansomLook, ransomware.live, RansomWatch). We do not collect or host stolen data — only the metadata, timestamps and screenshots needed to make the public disclosure searchable and accountable. Records here are corrected when the original post is edited, retracted, or merged with another disclosure.