Skip to main content

Ransomware victim disclosure

All victims

AZ Pay

listed as azpay.me · Claimed by Apt73 · listed 2 years ago

19m
Age
since listed · data leaked

Status timeline

  1. ListedDec 5, 2024
  2. Data leakeddate unknown

At a glance

Group
Apt73
Status
Data leaked
Country
Azerbaijan
Sector
Financial
Listed on leak site
Dec 5, 2024

About the victim

AI dossier — public-source company profile

AZ Pay is a financial services company founded in 2018 that develops customized payment and sales solutions for various market segments, with a focus on intermediate markets. The company operates in Azerbaijan.

Industry
Financial Services & Payments
Founded
2018

Attack summary

Severity: medium — Financial services company with confirmed disclosure by ransomware group, but no explicit proof files advertised, data inventory details, or ransom demand visible in the truncated post. Sector sensitivity warrants medium rating pending fuller post review.

Apt73 claims to have accessed AZ Pay systems. The group has published the leak post but specific details about what data was exfiltrated or whether encryption was deployed are not clearly stated in the available excerpt.

medium

What the group claims

Azape began its journey in 2018 by developing customized projects for various market segments, with its focus on developing solutions for intermedi...

Sources

Source

Indexed 2 years ago

This page surfaces a public ransomware disclosure indexed by Darkfield. Original posts come from the operator's own leak site; we cross-check against ransomware.live, RansomLook and RansomWatch where applicable. Share this URL freely.

Is this your supplier? Your competitor? You?

Pro plans monitor your domain, corporate emails, and crypto wallets across every new ransomware leak-site post, breach dump and Telegram callout — alerts within 5 minutes.

Disclosure context

About Apt73

APT73 is a recently emerged ransomware group that began operations in April 2024, with financial motivation as their primary driver based on their targeting patterns across multiple high-value sectors. The group has demonstrated rapid growth in their operational tempo, accumulating 78 documented victims within their first months of activity. Their targeting methodology shows a preference for English-speaking markets and major economies, with the United Kingdom and United States representing their primary focus areas, followed by significant activity in India, Brazil, and France. The group exhibits a clear preference for high-value sectors including business services, technology, financial services, and healthcare organizations, suggesting a calculated approach to victim selection based on potential payment capability and operational impact. Given the group's recent emergence and limited public documentation from major threat intelligence sources, specific details regarding their initial access vectors, tooling, encryption methods, or organizational structure remain largely unconfirmed by authoritative sources such as CISA, FBI, or established security research firms. The group's current operational status appears active based on the timeline of their emergence, though comprehensive analysis of their capabilities and infrastructure requires additional intelligence gathering and documentation by security researchers. The group has been linked to 161 public disclosures across our corpus. First observed on a leak site on April 22, 2024; most recent post July 6, 2026. The operation is currently inactive.

Also tracked as: Eraleign.

Timeline of this disclosure

  • December 5, 2024azpay.me listed by Apt73on the group's public leak site

Sector and geography

This disclosure adds to ransomware activity in the Financial sector, which has 426 disclosures indexed across all operators we track. Geographically, azpay.me is reported in Azerbaijan.

If your organisation is affected

A listing by Apt73 means azpay.me appeared on a ransomware extortion site and data attributed to it has been published. If this is your organisation, or a supplier you depend on, the priority is to confirm the intrusion and contain it before the window to act closes.

  • Engage your incident-response team and preserve forensic evidence before remediating — do not wipe affected systems first.
  • Force a password reset and revoke active sessions for exposed accounts; rotate any credentials, API keys or certificates that may have been in the stolen data.
  • Assess regulatory notification duties (GDPR, NIS2, sector regulators) — many carry a 72-hour reporting clock from awareness.
  • Monitor for the data appearing on Apt73's leak site and across paste and breach channels, and brief downstream partners who may be exposed through you.

How we know this. Darkfield monitors public ransomware leak sites continuously, archiving every new disclosure and the data later released against the victim. Each entry on this page is sourced from the operator's own publication and cross-checked against complementary OSINT feeds (RansomLook, ransomware.live, RansomWatch). We do not collect or host stolen data — only the metadata, timestamps and screenshots needed to make the public disclosure searchable and accountable. Records here are corrected when the original post is edited, retracted, or merged with another disclosure.