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STERRER GmbH

listed as sterrer.net · Claimed by Safepay · listed 13 hours ago

Today
Age
since listed · data leaked

Status timeline

  1. ListedOct 5, 2026
  2. Data leakeddate unknown

At a glance

Group
Safepay
Status
Data leaked
Listed on leak site
Oct 5, 2026

About the victim

AI dossier — public-source company profile

STERRER GmbH is an Austrian family-owned company established in 1979, based in Gaspoltshofen, Upper Austria. It specializes in poultry-house equipment, systems design, and the production and distribution of laying hens (pullets), serving commercial poultry farms across Europe with planning, installation, maintenance, and technical support.

Industry
Poultry Farming Technology & Equipment
Address
Kirchdorf 2, A-4673 Gaspoltshofen, Upper Austria, Austria
Founded
1979

Attack summary

Severity: low — Only listing/announcement with no proof files, no data inventory disclosed, no operational impact stated, and no confirmation of data exfiltration or encryption. The post explicitly states 'The link will be added soon,' indicating no evidence has yet been published.

The SafePay group claims to have compromised STERRER GmbH. The leak post provides no details on the attack method, data exfiltrated, or encryption status. No operational impact, ransom demand, or specific data categories are mentioned.

low

What the group claims

The company has operated since 1979 and combines agricultural production with technical services for commercial poultry farms. Its activities include …

The leak post

captured from the group's site
STERRER GmbH is an Austrian family-owned company based in Gaspoltshofen, Upper Austria, specializing in poultry farming technology, poultry-house equipment and the production and distribution of young laying hens (pullets).
The company has operated since 1979 and combines agricultural production with technical services for commercial poultry farms. Its activities include planning poultry housing systems, supplying and installing equipment, and providing ongoing technical and herd-management support.The company's poultry-technology division provides solutions for the construction and modernization of poultry facilities. Services include stall planning, ventilation and feeding systems, housing equipment, technical installation, maintenance and spare-parts supply. STERRER also supplies equipment such as fiberglass feed silos and other components used in professional poultry production.
The link will be added soon.

Sources

Source

Indexed 13 hours ago

This page surfaces a public ransomware disclosure indexed by Darkfield. Original posts come from the operator's own leak site; we cross-check against ransomware.live, RansomLook and RansomWatch where applicable. Share this URL freely.

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Disclosure context

About safepay

The Safepay ransomware group is a newly emerged threat actor first observed in November 2024, demonstrating rapid operational scale with 444 documented victims in a short timeframe, indicating financially motivated cybercriminal activity. Due to the group's recent emergence, publicly documented information about their country of origin, affiliations, and operational model remains limited among established threat intelligence sources. Given the recency of their appearance and lack of detailed technical analysis from major security firms, their specific attack methodologies, initial access vectors, and encryption techniques have not been comprehensively documented in public threat intelligence reporting. The group has demonstrated a broad targeting approach across multiple sectors including manufacturing, technology, education, and healthcare, with primary focus on victims in the United States, Germany, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia, though no specific high-profile campaigns or notable incidents have been publicly attributed to them by major security vendors or law enforcement agencies. As of the latest available intelligence, Safepay appears to remain active, though comprehensive threat profiling is limited due to the group's recent emergence and the current lack of detailed technical analysis from established cybersecurity research organizations. The group has been linked to 872 public disclosures across our corpus. First observed on a leak site on November 19, 2024; most recent post October 6, 2026. The operation is currently active.

Timeline of this disclosure

  • October 5, 2026sterrer.net listed by safepay on the group's public leak site

Sector and geography

This disclosure adds to ransomware activity in the Technology sector, which has 3,581 disclosures indexed across all operators we track. Geographically, sterrer.net is reported in Netherlands, a country with 42 ransomware disclosures in our corpus.

If your organisation is affected

A listing by safepay means sterrer.net appeared on a ransomware extortion site and data attributed to it has been published. If this is your organisation, or a supplier you depend on, the priority is to confirm the intrusion and contain it before the window to act closes.

  • Engage your incident-response team and preserve forensic evidence before remediating — do not wipe affected systems first.
  • Force a password reset and revoke active sessions for exposed accounts; rotate any credentials, API keys or certificates that may have been in the stolen data.
  • Assess regulatory notification duties (GDPR, NIS2, sector regulators) — many carry a 72-hour reporting clock from awareness.
  • Report the incident to your national CERT, NCSC-NL (Netherlands), as required for your jurisdiction.
  • Monitor for the data appearing on safepay's leak site and across paste and breach channels, and brief downstream partners who may be exposed through you.

How we know this. Darkfield monitors public ransomware leak sites continuously, archiving every new disclosure and the data later released against the victim. Each entry on this page is sourced from the operator's own publication and cross-checked against complementary OSINT feeds (RansomLook, ransomware.live, RansomWatch). We do not collect or host stolen data — only the metadata, timestamps and screenshots needed to make the public disclosure searchable and accountable. Records here are corrected when the original post is edited, retracted, or merged with another disclosure.