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Ransomware victim disclosure

All victims

National Ticket Company

Claimed by Bert · listed 1 year ago

15m
Age
since listed · data leaked

Status timeline

  1. ListedApr 6, 2025
  2. Data leakeddate unknown

At a glance

Group
Bert
Status
Data leaked
Listed on leak site
Apr 6, 2025

About the victim

AI dossier — public-source company profile

National Ticket Company is a family-owned online printer founded in 1907 that specializes in ticketing and wristband solutions for theaters, concert venues, sporting events, museums, festivals, and other event organizers. They manufacture both stock and custom event access and redemption products including Tyvek wristbands, plastic wristbands, and various ticket types.

Industry
Event Ticketing & Wristband Printing
Founded
1907

Attack summary

Severity: low — Post contains only company identification with no substantive attack claims, proof files, data inventory, or operational impact stated. Insufficient evidence of actual breach activity.

The leak post contains only a basic company description with no details on what data was claimed to be exfiltrated or encrypted, nor any specific attack claims or proof materials.

low

What the group claims

National Ticket Company – Tickets and wristbands since 1907.

Sources

Source

Indexed 1 year ago

This page surfaces a public ransomware disclosure indexed by Darkfield. Original posts come from the operator's own leak site; we cross-check against ransomware.live, RansomLook and RansomWatch where applicable. Share this URL freely.

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Disclosure context

About bert

The "bert" ransomware group is a recently emerged threat actor first observed in April 2025, appearing to be financially motivated based on their ransomware operations targeting multiple sectors across several countries. Given the limited public documentation and recent emergence, the group's origin and affiliations remain unclear, though their targeting pattern suggests either independent operations or a small-scale ransomware-as-a-service model. With only seven documented victims to date, specific details about their attack methodology, initial access vectors, and encryption techniques have not been extensively documented by major security firms or law enforcement agencies. The group has demonstrated a diverse targeting approach, focusing primarily on organizations in the United States, Malaysia, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and Turkey, with victims spanning technology, business services, healthcare, and transportation/logistics sectors. No major high-profile campaigns or significant law enforcement actions have been publicly reported against this group, likely due to their recent emergence and relatively small scale of operations. The group appears to remain active as of their recent first observation, though their limited victim count and lack of extensive public documentation suggest they are either a nascent operation or a low-profile threat actor that has not yet attracted significant attention from major cybersecurity researchers or government agencies. The group has been linked to 7 public disclosures across our corpus. First observed on a leak site on April 6, 2025; most recent post June 10, 2025. The operation is currently inactive.

Timeline of this disclosure

  • April 6, 2025National Ticket Company listed by berton the group's public leak site

Sector and geography

This disclosure adds to ransomware activity in the Business Services sector, which has 3,796 disclosures indexed across all operators we track. Geographically, National Ticket Company is reported in United States, a country with 11,033 ransomware disclosures in our corpus.

If your organisation is affected

A listing by bert means National Ticket Company appeared on a ransomware extortion site and data attributed to it has been published. If this is your organisation, or a supplier you depend on, the priority is to confirm the intrusion and contain it before the window to act closes.

  • Engage your incident-response team and preserve forensic evidence before remediating — do not wipe affected systems first.
  • Force a password reset and revoke active sessions for exposed accounts; rotate any credentials, API keys or certificates that may have been in the stolen data.
  • Assess regulatory notification duties (GDPR, NIS2, sector regulators) — many carry a 72-hour reporting clock from awareness.
  • Report the incident to your national CERT, CISA (United States), as required for your jurisdiction.
  • Monitor for the data appearing on bert's leak site and across paste and breach channels, and brief downstream partners who may be exposed through you.

How we know this. Darkfield monitors public ransomware leak sites continuously, archiving every new disclosure and the data later released against the victim. Each entry on this page is sourced from the operator's own publication and cross-checked against complementary OSINT feeds (RansomLook, ransomware.live, RansomWatch). We do not collect or host stolen data — only the metadata, timestamps and screenshots needed to make the public disclosure searchable and accountable. Records here are corrected when the original post is edited, retracted, or merged with another disclosure.