Payloadbin is a relatively obscure ransomware group that emerged in September 2021, primarily motivated by financial gain through extortion operations targeting diverse sectors across multiple countries. The group's origin and potential affiliations remain largely undocumented in public threat intelligence reporting, with limited information available regarding whether they operate as an independent entity or utilize a Ransomware-as-a-Service model. Based on observed victim patterns, Payloadbin has demonstrated a broad targeting approach without apparent sector specialization, though they have notably impacted healthcare, manufacturing, agriculture and food production, and telecommunications organizations across 48 documented cases. Their attack methodology and specific technical capabilities have not been extensively documented by major security research organizations, though their operational pattern suggests standard ransomware deployment tactics. The group has primarily targeted victims in the United States, Philippines, Australia, Mexico, and the United Kingdom, indicating either a broad opportunistic approach or potential linguistic capabilities spanning English-speaking regions and select international markets. No major high-profile campaigns, significant law enforcement disruptions, or notable ransomware payment records have been publicly attributed to this group by federal agencies or established threat intelligence firms. Current operational status remains unclear due to limited public documentation, though the group's relatively recent emergence and modest victim count suggests they may represent a smaller-scale operation compared to prominent ransomware families tracked by CISA and FBI reporting. The group has been linked to 48 public disclosures across our corpus. First observed on a leak site on September 9, 2021; most recent post March 26, 2026. The operation is currently active.
How we know this. Darkfield monitors public ransomware leak sites continuously, archiving every new disclosure and the data later released against the victim. Each entry on this page is sourced from the operator's own publication and cross-checked against complementary OSINT feeds (RansomLook, ransomware.live, RansomWatch). We do not collect or host stolen data — only the metadata, timestamps and screenshots needed to make the public disclosure searchable and accountable. Records here are corrected when the original post is edited, retracted, or merged with another disclosure.