Was carc.gov.jo hit by ransomware?

carc.gov.jo was listed by the babuk2 ransomware operation (Jordan), and stolen data was published on the group's leak site. Darkfield tracks this disclosure with the original leak post, screenshot and group context.

Who is the babuk2 ransomware group?

babuk2 is a ransomware operator tracked by Darkfield. See the full operator dossier for its known victims, sectors targeted, IOCs and leak-site infrastructure.

What data was leaked in the carc.gov.jo breach?

babuk2 published data attributed to carc.gov.jo. Darkfield captured the leak post and a screenshot of the listing.

Ransomware victim disclosure

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Civil Aviation Regulatory Commission

listed as carc.gov.jo · Claimed by Babuk2 · listed 1 year ago

17m

Age

since listed · data leaked

Status timeline

ListedJan 27, 2025
Data leakeddate unknown

At a glance

Group: Babuk2
Status: Data leaked
Country: Jordan
Sector: Public Sector
Listed on leak site: Jan 27, 2025

About the victim

AI dossier — public-source company profile

The Civil Aviation Regulatory Commission (CARC) is Jordan's government authority responsible for regulating and overseeing civil aviation. It issues licenses and certifications for pilots, aircraft, maintenance facilities, and flight training academies; investigates aviation accidents; and enforces aviation safety standards and air traffic management across Jordanian airspace.

Industry: Aviation Regulatory Authority & Government
Address: Amman, Jordan

Attack summary

Severity: high — Compromise of a national aviation regulator poses operational and security risk to critical infrastructure (air transport, civil aviation safety). Government sector with access to sensitive aviation data and regulatory systems.

Babuk2 claims to have compromised the CARC website (carc.gov.jo). The leak post provides minimal detail; no specific data exfiltration or encryption impact is stated in the available snippet.

high

Data the group says was taken

AI dossier — extracted from the leak post

Aviation licensing records
Pilot certifications
Aircraft registration data
Regulatory documents
Government communications

What the group claims

carc.gov

Sources

Source

Indexed 1 year ago

This page surfaces a public ransomware disclosure indexed by Darkfield. Original posts come from the operator's own leak site; we cross-check against ransomware.live, RansomLook and RansomWatch where applicable. Share this URL freely.

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Disclosure context

About babuk2

Babuk2 appears to be a recently emerged ransomware operation first observed in January 2025, representing either a new variant or successor to the original Babuk ransomware group, with apparent financial motivations based on their targeting patterns across multiple sectors and geographic regions. Given the limited timeframe since their emergence and the naming convention, this group likely operates independently or represents a rebrand/evolution of previous Babuk operations, though definitive attribution remains unclear due to the recency of their activities. Based on their targeting patterns across diverse sectors including public sector entities, technology companies, healthcare organizations, and manufacturing firms, the group appears to employ broad-spectrum attack methodologies typical of modern ransomware operations, though specific technical details regarding their initial access vectors, encryption methods, and extortion tactics have not yet been extensively documented by major security researchers. With 180 documented victims across multiple countries including significant activity in the United States, Brazil, India, Indonesia, and China within just the first month of 2025, Babuk2 has demonstrated a notably aggressive operational tempo, though specific high-profile incidents or ransom demands have not yet been publicly detailed by major cybersecurity firms or law enforcement agencies. The group appears to remain actively operational as of early 2025, though their recent emergence means long-term operational patterns and potential law enforcement responses are still developing. The group has been linked to 180 public disclosures across our corpus. First observed on a leak site on January 27, 2025; most recent post April 23, 2025. The operation is currently inactive.

Timeline of this disclosure

January 27, 2025carc.gov.jo listed by babuk2on the group's public leak site

Other recent disclosures by babuk2

babuk2 has been linked to 180 public victims on Darkfield. A sample of the most recent:

See the full babuk2 dossier →

Sector and geography

This disclosure adds to ransomware activity in the Public Sector sector, which has 466 disclosures indexed across all operators we track. Geographically, carc.gov.jo is reported in Jordan, a country with 11 ransomware disclosures in our corpus.

If your organisation is affected

A listing by babuk2 means carc.gov.jo appeared on a ransomware extortion site and data attributed to it has been published. If this is your organisation, or a supplier you depend on, the priority is to confirm the intrusion and contain it before the window to act closes.

Engage your incident-response team and preserve forensic evidence before remediating — do not wipe affected systems first.
Force a password reset and revoke active sessions for exposed accounts; rotate any credentials, API keys or certificates that may have been in the stolen data.
Assess regulatory notification duties (GDPR, NIS2, sector regulators) — many carry a 72-hour reporting clock from awareness.
Monitor for the data appearing on babuk2's leak site and across paste and breach channels, and brief downstream partners who may be exposed through you.

How we know this. Darkfield monitors public ransomware leak sites continuously, archiving every new disclosure and the data later released against the victim. Each entry on this page is sourced from the operator's own publication and cross-checked against complementary OSINT feeds (RansomLook, ransomware.live, RansomWatch). We do not collect or host stolen data — only the metadata, timestamps and screenshots needed to make the public disclosure searchable and accountable. Records here are corrected when the original post is edited, retracted, or merged with another disclosure.