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ERPIS LLC

listed as ERPIS LLC (ShipERP) · Claimed by AUR0RA · listed 5 days ago

705 MB QuickBooks DB + 13 GB customer SAP configs + 245 GB SAP installation media
Data size
88 enterprise customers, 128+ SAP PSE files, $20.6M contract backlog records
5d
Age
since listed · data leaked

Status timeline

  1. ListedSep 8, 2026
  2. Data leakeddate unknown

At a glance

Group
AUR0RA
Status
Data leaked
Country
United States
Sector
Software/SAP Integration
Listed on leak site
Sep 8, 2026
Data size
705 MB QuickBooks DB + 13 GB customer SAP configs + 245 GB SAP installation media
Records
88 enterprise customers, 128+ SAP PSE files, $20.6M contract backlog

About the victim

AI dossier — public-source company profile

ERPIS LLC, operating as ShipERP, is a Texas-based SAP integrator specializing in enterprise shipping management software. The company serves major Fortune 500 clients including Boeing, Pfizer, NVIDIA, John Deere, and Medtronic, with 83+ enterprise customers and a reported $20.6M backlog.

Industry
Enterprise Software & SAP Integration
Address
Texas, US

Attack summary

Severity: critical — Exfiltration of proprietary source code representing the company's entire revenue asset, combined with 128+ SAP cryptographic keys enabling impersonation attacks and compromise of 83+ Fortune 500 enterprise customers' SAP environments. Exposure of customer configurations and installation media amplifies downstream risk to regulated sectors (aerospace, pharma, semiconductor, medical devices).

AUR0RA claims to have exfiltrated complete product source code (ShipERP versions 2.0–5.4), 128+ SAP cryptographic private keys (PSE files) enabling JWT forgery and TLS impersonation, 705 MB of QuickBooks databases, 13 GB of customer SAP configurations, and 245 GB of SAP installation media. The breach exposes the company's sole revenue-generating asset and compromises cryptographic security controls across customer deployments.

critical

Data the group says was taken

AI dossier — extracted from the leak post
  • Complete product source code (ShipERP 2.0–5.4)
  • SAP cryptographic private keys (PSE files)
  • QuickBooks database export
  • Customer SAP configurations
  • SAP installation media
  • Enterprise customer deployment data

What the group claims

Texas-based SAP integrator whose single product is enterprise shipping management software used by Boeing, Pfizer, NVIDIA, John Deere, Medtronic, and 83 other enterprise customers.

The leak post

captured from the group's site
[ Jinny Beauty Supply is one of the largest Korean-American wholesale beauty distributors in the US, operating 9 distribution centers from Doraville, Georgia to Commerce, California. They serve 7,400+ beauty supply stores and 2,800+ international distributors. The exposed material includes: A complete password vault export — 50+ plaintext credentials for PayPal, Braintree, Amazon Seller Central, eBay, Acumatica ERP (production), 12 state tax portals, FedEx, UPS, ShipStation, Microsoft 365, Google Analytics, and internal email. VMware hypervisor root credentials — vCenter and ESXi root passwords giving complete control over the entire virtual infrastructure. 911 scanned credit card authorization forms — full card numbers, CVV, expiry dates, and cardholder signatures for beauty supply store customers across 26 US states. Complete employee compensation database — ~260 employees with Korean and English names, departments, salaries, bonuses, and 1099 contractor data spanning 2015–2018. A 340 MB Shopify database backup — full customer table (names, emails, phones, addresses), product catalog, pricing, and warehouse assignments. Active Directory domain enumeration — all 239+ user accounts…

Data the group says was taken

  • product source code
  • SAP cryptographic private keys
  • financial database
  • payroll data
  • SSN
  • bank accounts
  • customer contracts
  • API credentials
  • SAP installation media
  • customer SAP integration configurations

Screenshot of the leak post

Leak screenshot for ERPIS LLC (ShipERP)

Sources

Source

Indexed 5 days ago

This page surfaces a public ransomware disclosure indexed by Darkfield. Original posts come from the operator's own leak site; we cross-check against ransomware.live, RansomLook and RansomWatch where applicable. Share this URL freely.

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Disclosure context

About AUR0RA

AUR0RA is a ransomware group first observed in June 2026 with an apparent financial motivation, having claimed responsibility for attacks against at least five known victims across the United States, Canada, and Australia. Given the recency of the group's emergence and the limited number of confirmed victims, detailed public attribution from major threat intelligence organizations such as CISA, the FBI, or Mandiant has not yet been established, and as such claims regarding origin, affiliation, or operational infrastructure cannot be responsibly made at this time. The group's targeting pattern suggests a deliberate focus on mid-market industries including commercial interiors, real estate and title insurance, warehousing and material handling, manufacturing, and oil and gas and industrial manufacturing sectors, which may indicate an opportunistic selection strategy or a preference for organizations with potentially sensitive operational or financial data and limited cybersecurity maturity. No specific attack methodology, tooling, or extortion tactics have been publicly documented by reputable sources for this group as of the time of this writing, though the sector targeting profile is consistent with groups known to conduct double extortion operations. AUR0RA should be considered an emerging threat actor under active monitoring, with its current operational status assessed as active based on the recency of first observed activity and the absence of any publicly reported law enforcement disruption or disbandment. The group has been linked to 15 public disclosures across our corpus. First observed on a leak site on June 6, 2026; most recent post September 8, 2026. The operation is currently active.

Timeline of this disclosure

  • September 8, 2026ERPIS LLC (ShipERP) listed by AUR0RA on the group's public leak site
Data size
705 MB QuickBooks DB + 13 GB customer SAP configs + 245 GB SAP installation media
Records
88 enterprise customers, 128+ SAP PSE files, $20.6M contract backlog

Other recent disclosures by AUR0RA

AUR0RA has been linked to 15 public victims on Darkfield. A sample of the most recent:

See the full AUR0RA dossier →

Sector and geography

This disclosure adds to ransomware activity in the Software/SAP Integration sector. Geographically, ERPIS LLC (ShipERP) is reported in United States, a country with 3,165 ransomware disclosures in our corpus.

If your organisation is affected

A listing by AUR0RA means ERPIS LLC (ShipERP) appeared on a ransomware extortion site and data attributed to it has been published. If this is your organisation, or a supplier you depend on, the priority is to confirm the intrusion and contain it before the window to act closes.

  • Engage your incident-response team and preserve forensic evidence before remediating — do not wipe affected systems first.
  • Force a password reset and revoke active sessions for exposed accounts; rotate any credentials, API keys or certificates that may have been in the stolen data.
  • Assess regulatory notification duties (GDPR, NIS2, sector regulators) — many carry a 72-hour reporting clock from awareness.
  • Report the incident to your national CERT, CISA (United States), as required for your jurisdiction.
  • Monitor for the data appearing on AUR0RA's leak site and across paste and breach channels, and brief downstream partners who may be exposed through you.

How we know this. Darkfield monitors public ransomware leak sites continuously, archiving every new disclosure and the data later released against the victim. Each entry on this page is sourced from the operator's own publication and cross-checked against complementary OSINT feeds (RansomLook, ransomware.live, RansomWatch). We do not collect or host stolen data — only the metadata, timestamps and screenshots needed to make the public disclosure searchable and accountable. Records here are corrected when the original post is edited, retracted, or merged with another disclosure.