Locky is a ransomware family that emerged in March 2016 as a financially motivated threat, operating through a ransomware-as-a-service model that enabled multiple affiliates to deploy the malware against targets worldwide. The ransomware is believed to have originated from Russian-speaking cybercriminal groups and was distributed through the Necurs botnet and other established malware distribution networks. Locky primarily gained initial access through malicious email attachments, particularly macro-enabled Microsoft Office documents, and was notable for its use of sophisticated encryption algorithms including AES and RSA to lock victim files, with operators typically exfiltrating sensitive data before encryption to enable double extortion tactics. The ransomware gained significant notoriety for targeting critical infrastructure sectors including healthcare facilities, emergency services, and government organizations primarily in the United States, with some variants demanding ransoms equivalent to hundreds of thousands of dollars. While Locky experienced periods of high activity between 2016 and 2018, its operations have significantly diminished in recent years, with security researchers observing minimal new campaign activity since 2019, though the underlying infrastructure and techniques have influenced subsequent ransomware families. The group has been linked to 3 public disclosures across our corpus. First observed on a leak site on March 18, 2016; most recent post December 12, 2016. The operation is currently inactive.
Also tracked as: Locky-Odin, Locky-Osiris, Locky-Osiris 2016, Locky-Osiris 2017.
Sector and geography
This disclosure adds to ransomware activity in the Government Facilities sector, which has 84 disclosures indexed across all operators we track. Geographically, Columbiana County Juvenile Court System is reported in United States, a country with 7,392 ransomware disclosures in our corpus.
How we know this. Darkfield monitors public ransomware leak sites continuously, archiving every new disclosure and the data later released against the victim. Each entry on this page is sourced from the operator's own publication and cross-checked against complementary OSINT feeds (RansomLook, ransomware.live, RansomWatch). We do not collect or host stolen data — only the metadata, timestamps and screenshots needed to make the public disclosure searchable and accountable. Records here are corrected when the original post is edited, retracted, or merged with another disclosure.
