SunCrypt is a financially motivated ransomware group that emerged in August 2020, operating as a relatively smaller but persistent threat actor in the cybercriminal landscape. The group's country of origin remains unclear, though they appear to operate independently rather than as a Ransomware-as-a-Service model, with limited documented connections to other established ransomware families. SunCrypt typically gains initial access through common vectors such as phishing emails and exploitation of remote desktop protocol vulnerabilities, and they employ double extortion tactics by exfiltrating sensitive data before deploying their encryption payload, threatening to publish stolen information if ransom demands are not met. The group has demonstrated a particular focus on targeting critical infrastructure sectors, having compromised at least 32 known victims primarily across the United States and United Kingdom, with healthcare organizations, educational institutions, manufacturing companies, and technology firms representing their preferred targets. While SunCrypt has not achieved the notoriety of major ransomware operations like Conti or REvil, they have maintained consistent activity since their emergence, though their current operational status appears to have diminished significantly with reduced observed activity in recent reporting periods. The group has been linked to 32 public disclosures across our corpus. First observed on a leak site on August 24, 2020; most recent post June 18, 2022. The operation is currently inactive.
Also tracked as: Sun.
Sector and geography
This disclosure adds to ransomware activity in the Healthcare and Public Health sector, which has 54 disclosures indexed across all operators we track. Geographically, University Hospital New Jersey is reported in United States, a country with 11,033 ransomware disclosures in our corpus.
If your organisation is affected
A listing by Suncrypt means University Hospital New Jersey appeared on a ransomware extortion site and data attributed to it has been published. If this is your organisation, or a supplier you depend on, the priority is to confirm the intrusion and contain it before the window to act closes.
- Engage your incident-response team and preserve forensic evidence before remediating — do not wipe affected systems first.
- Force a password reset and revoke active sessions for exposed accounts; rotate any credentials, API keys or certificates that may have been in the stolen data.
- Assess regulatory notification duties (GDPR, NIS2, sector regulators) — many carry a 72-hour reporting clock from awareness.
- Report the incident to your national CERT, CISA (United States), as required for your jurisdiction.
- Monitor for the data appearing on Suncrypt's leak site and across paste and breach channels, and brief downstream partners who may be exposed through you.
How we know this. Darkfield monitors public ransomware leak sites continuously, archiving every new disclosure and the data later released against the victim. Each entry on this page is sourced from the operator's own publication and cross-checked against complementary OSINT feeds (RansomLook, ransomware.live, RansomWatch). We do not collect or host stolen data — only the metadata, timestamps and screenshots needed to make the public disclosure searchable and accountable. Records here are corrected when the original post is edited, retracted, or merged with another disclosure.
