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WinFashion Technologies

listed as winfashion · Claimed by Dragonforce · listed 5 hours ago

Today
Age
since listed · data leaked

Status timeline

  1. ListedSep 24, 2026
  2. Data leakeddate unknown

At a glance

Group
Dragonforce
Status
Data leaked
Sector
Retail & E-Commerce
Listed on leak site
Sep 24, 2026

About the victim

AI dossier — public-source company profile

WinFashion Technologies is a B2B SaaS provider of ERP solutions and mobile applications for the fashion and retail industry, founded in 1994. The company serves 250+ fashion brands globally with its WF125sR/Fabric ERP V.10 platform, offering integrations with major e-commerce and EDI systems. They operate offices in Los Angeles, New York, Shanghai, and India, and provide 24/7 multilingual support.

Industry
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) Software & Services
Address
Los Angeles, USA (with offices in New York, Shanghai, and India)
Founded
1994

Attack summary

Severity: critical — Multi-tenant SaaS breach with confirmed exfiltration of highly sensitive data: payment card data (PCI DSS), employee PII including HR records (CCPA/CPRA), customer/vendor PII across 40 brands (GDPR), proprietary ERP source code, database backups, payment processing infrastructure credentials, and SSL/EDI certificates. Affects publicly traded issuers (SEC risk). Regulatory exposure across multiple frameworks.

The DragonForce group claims to have exfiltrated approximately 73 GB of data comprising ~205,000 files across WinFashion's infrastructure. The breach exposes the full ERP source code, database backups of at least one client (Kaktus), payment processing credentials (Authorize.Net), SSL certificates, EDI/VAN certificates, employee HR records, and complete B2B trade data for approximately 40 fashion brands.

critical

Data the group says was taken

AI dossier — extracted from the leak post
  • MSSQL database backup (Kaktus client ERP)
  • SSL PFX containers and EDI certificates
  • ASP.NET Web.config files with hardcoded secrets
  • Payment card data and Authorize.Net credentials
  • Bank account details (IBAN/SWIFT)
  • Invoice registers and financial records
  • Product catalogs and style masters (40+ brands)
  • EDI transaction files (PO, ASN, invoices)
  • Employee HR records and payroll data (76 MB)
  • Accounts receivable data
  • Integration source code (8,577 C# files)
  • PowerBuilder ERP core files (5,828 .pbd files)
  • Database schema and procedures (3,398 SQL files)
  • WinSCP SFTP session logs (33,307 files)

The group's post references roughly 205000 proof files.

What the group claims

══════════════════════════ ══════════════════════════ ══════════════════════════ WINFASHION TECHNOLOGIES DUMP: DATA LEAK ANALYSIS OF A B2B ERP PLATFORM FOR THE FASHION INDUSTRY ══════════════════════════ ══════════════════════════ ══════════════════════════ This is a preliminary analysis, processing of sensitive data is currently underway. Target: WinFashion Technologies (Los Angeles, USA) — an international B2B provider of ERP solutions (WF125sR / Fabric ERP V.10) for 250+ fashion brands. Offices in New York, Shanghai, and India. Integrations: Shopify, Acenda, JOOR, NuORDER, CommerceHub, FashionGo. BPO/EDI processing via Inovis/QRS. DUMP VOLUME: ~205K files / ~13K directories / ~73 Gigabytes AT-RISK FILES: 125,274 (61.0%) Critical: 9,350 High: 78,174 Medium: 37,750 PRELIMINARY FINDINGS: ▸ kaktus.bak (5.64 GB) — full MSSQL backup of the "Kaktus" client's ERP installation (Customer Master, Style Master, EDI, AR) ▸ 6 SSL PFX containers + EDI-VAN client certificate for ECGrid/OpenText ▸ 33,307 .shxml files — WinSCP SFTP session logs (hosts, paths, sizes) ▸ 332 ASP.NET Web.config files — potentially hardcoded Shopify / Authorize.Net secrets ▸ 171 files with PAN / CreditCard / Cardholder / Payment data — Authorize.Net payment processing code ▸ 39 files with IBAN / SWIFT / BankAccount data — bank account details ▸ 259 Invoice Register / Invoice data files — Excel payment registers (up to 124 MB) CLIENT DATA (~40 BRANDS): ▸ STYLEMASTER.xlsx (48 MB) — aggregated product catalog export ▸ Vendors.XLS (20 MB) + test customers.XLS (7 MB) — Kaktus vendors and customers ▸ 40,621 EDI files (.edi / .850 / .856 / .810 / .997 / .852 / .832 / .846) — full B2B trade lifecycle (PO, ASN, invoices, price catalogs) INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ▸ 8,577 .cs files — integration source code (Authorize.Net, Shopify, Acenda, JOOR, NuORDER, DSCO) ▸ 5,828 .pbd files — PowerBuilder WF125sR ERP core ▸ 3,398 .sql files — DB schema, triggers, CLR procedures ▸ 18 .dbf / .mdf files — legacy DBASE / FOXPRO / MSSQL tables without encryption HR / PII: ▸ INV EMPLOYEE ALLOWANCE YTD.xlsx (76 MB) — employee HR data ▸ AR Aging 12.30.25.xls + AR Aging 12.29.25.XLS — accounts receivable for Monrow and Kaktus clients REGULATORY RISKS: ▸ PCI DSS — compromise of PAN processing code + Authorize Excel registers ▸ CCPA / CPRA — HR-PII (76 MB), California jurisdiction ▸ FTC — "total security" claims amidst PFX / DBF / Web.config compromise ▸ SEC (Regulation FD) — risk for publicly traded client issuers ▸ GDPR — PII of customers / vendors across ~40 brands The dump represents a cross-tenant B2B SaaS incident involving the disclosure of trade secrets for ~40 fashion brands, the compromise of the Authorize.Net payment infrastructure, and the exposure of the full ERP source code.

The leak post

captured from the group's site
No. 225, Lane 54, An Ho Road Sec. 2 Tainan, Taiwan, R.O.C
On August 30, HEC Group issued an official statement addressed to shareholders of TPE:3032 and other stakeholders, announcing that the company had been the targ...
No. 25, Gongye 2nd Rd, Renwu District, Kaohsiung City, Taiwan 814
Elite Industech Co., Ltd. (established in 2003) is a certified Class-A waste treatment plant based in Kaohsiung, Taiwan. The company operates within the circula...
Publicated files: 
9, ZA des Quatre vents, BP16, 95650 Boissy L'Aillerie, France
BMGP Groupe (Polyresine) is an established French manufacturer specializing in the formulation, production, and distribution of synthetic resins and high-perfor...
### Arizona Vascular Medical Equipment, Inc
5432 E. Southern Avenue, Suite 100, Mesa, AZ 85206, USA
Arizona Vascular Medical Equipment, Inc. is a trusted provider of specialized medical devices, focusing primarily on compression therapy solutions and vascular ...
Publicated files: 
Full DATA 400 GB+ The brain uses the eyes to gather information about our surroundings. The brain cannot process all our view so it must first decide what to l...
Publicated files: 
full data 200 GB+ We have been in busi…

Sources

Source

Indexed 5 hours ago

This page surfaces a public ransomware disclosure indexed by Darkfield. Original posts come from the operator's own leak site; we cross-check against ransomware.live, RansomLook and RansomWatch where applicable. Share this URL freely.

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Disclosure context

About Dragonforce

Dragonforce is a relatively new ransomware group that emerged in December 2023, operating with apparent financial motivations based on their targeting patterns and victim selection. The group's origin and potential affiliations remain unclear due to limited public documentation from established threat intelligence sources, though their rapid accumulation of 439 documented victims suggests either sophisticated capabilities or possible connections to existing ransomware infrastructure. Based on their targeting patterns across diverse sectors including manufacturing, business services, technology, and construction, Dragonforce appears to employ opportunistic attack methodologies, though specific initial access vectors, encryption methods, and extortion tactics have not been publicly detailed by major security firms or law enforcement agencies. The group has demonstrated a preference for targeting organizations primarily in English-speaking countries and Western Europe, with the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, and Italy representing their most frequent victim locations, suggesting possible language capabilities or geographic operational preferences. As of current reporting, Dragonforce appears to remain active given their recent emergence and ongoing victim acquisition, though the lack of detailed public analysis from major threat intelligence organizations indicates either operational security measures that have limited researcher visibility or that the group has not yet conducted sufficiently high-profile attacks to warrant extensive public documentation by CISA, FBI, or established security research firms. The group has been linked to 675 public disclosures across our corpus. First observed on a leak site on December 13, 2023; most recent post September 24, 2026. The operation is currently active.

Also tracked as: DRAGON FORCE.

Timeline of this disclosure

  • September 24, 2026winfashion listed by Dragonforce on the group's public leak site

Other recent disclosures by Dragonforce

Dragonforce has been linked to 675 public victims on Darkfield. A sample of the most recent:

See the full Dragonforce dossier →

Sector and geography

This disclosure adds to ransomware activity in the Retail & E-Commerce sector, which has 21 disclosures indexed across all operators we track.

If your organisation is affected

A listing by Dragonforce means winfashion appeared on a ransomware extortion site and data attributed to it has been published. If this is your organisation, or a supplier you depend on, the priority is to confirm the intrusion and contain it before the window to act closes.

  • Engage your incident-response team and preserve forensic evidence before remediating — do not wipe affected systems first.
  • Force a password reset and revoke active sessions for exposed accounts; rotate any credentials, API keys or certificates that may have been in the stolen data.
  • Assess regulatory notification duties (GDPR, NIS2, sector regulators) — many carry a 72-hour reporting clock from awareness.
  • Monitor for the data appearing on Dragonforce's leak site and across paste and breach channels, and brief downstream partners who may be exposed through you.

How we know this. Darkfield monitors public ransomware leak sites continuously, archiving every new disclosure and the data later released against the victim. Each entry on this page is sourced from the operator's own publication and cross-checked against complementary OSINT feeds (RansomLook, ransomware.live, RansomWatch). We do not collect or host stolen data — only the metadata, timestamps and screenshots needed to make the public disclosure searchable and accountable. Records here are corrected when the original post is edited, retracted, or merged with another disclosure.