Skip to main content

Ransomware victim disclosure

All victims

Stiga

listed as Stiga.com · Claimed by IMNCrew · listed 1 year ago

14m
Age
since listed · data leaked

Status timeline

  1. ListedMay 20, 2025
  2. Data leakeddate unknown

At a glance

Group
IMNCrew
Status
Data leaked
Country
Sweden
Listed on leak site
May 20, 2025

About the victim

AI dossier — public-source company profile

Stiga is a gardening equipment manufacturer founded in 1934, specializing in lawn mowers, tractors, chainsaws, and other gardening machinery. The company produces goods across multiple countries including Sweden, Italy, Slovakia, and China, and operates a consumer-facing e-commerce presence.

Industry
Garden Equipment & Lawn Care Machinery
Founded
1934

Attack summary

Severity: low — No proof files, screenshots, or specific data inventory are described in the leak post. No operational impact or data exfiltration details are stated. This appears to be an announcement-only listing.

IMNCrew claims to have compromised Stiga and published data. No specific details are provided in the post excerpt regarding encryption, exfiltration, or the nature of exposed data.

low

What the group claims

Founded in 1934, Stiga is a gardening brand focusing on innovation and designing effective gardening tools, machinery and equipment. Stiga's products are produced in Sweden, Italy, Slovakia and China.

Sources

Source

Indexed 1 year ago

This page surfaces a public ransomware disclosure indexed by Darkfield. Original posts come from the operator's own leak site; we cross-check against ransomware.live, RansomLook and RansomWatch where applicable. Share this URL freely.

Is this your supplier? Your competitor? You?

Pro plans monitor your domain, corporate emails, and crypto wallets across every new ransomware leak-site post, breach dump and Telegram callout — alerts within 5 minutes.

Disclosure context

About IMNCrew

IMNCrew is a recently emerged ransomware group first observed in May 2025, operating with apparent financial motivations based on their targeting patterns and victim selection. The group's origin and affiliations remain unclear due to limited public documentation, though their geographic targeting suggests potential international operations with no confirmed ties to established ransomware families or known state-sponsored actors. Based on available intelligence, IMNCrew appears to employ traditional ransomware deployment methods targeting organizations across multiple sectors, though specific technical details regarding their initial access vectors, encryption implementations, or data exfiltration capabilities have not been publicly documented by major security researchers or government agencies. The group has compromised approximately 12 known victims primarily across the United States, Sweden, Canada, Mexico, and Indonesia, with notable focus on consumer services, healthcare, financial services, and technology sectors. IMNCrew appears to remain active as of their recent emergence, though comprehensive threat intelligence regarding their operations, infrastructure, and specific attack methodologies requires further documentation from established security research organizations. The group has been linked to 12 public disclosures across our corpus. First observed on a leak site on May 5, 2025; most recent post September 16, 2025. The operation is currently inactive.

Also tracked as: imn crew.

Timeline of this disclosure

  • May 20, 2025Stiga.com listed by IMNCrewon the group's public leak site

Sector and geography

This disclosure adds to ransomware activity in the Consumer Services sector, which has 829 disclosures indexed across all operators we track. Geographically, Stiga.com is reported in Sweden, a country with 111 ransomware disclosures in our corpus.

If your organisation is affected

A listing by IMNCrew means Stiga.com appeared on a ransomware extortion site and data attributed to it has been published. If this is your organisation, or a supplier you depend on, the priority is to confirm the intrusion and contain it before the window to act closes.

  • Engage your incident-response team and preserve forensic evidence before remediating — do not wipe affected systems first.
  • Force a password reset and revoke active sessions for exposed accounts; rotate any credentials, API keys or certificates that may have been in the stolen data.
  • Assess regulatory notification duties (GDPR, NIS2, sector regulators) — many carry a 72-hour reporting clock from awareness.
  • Report the incident to your national CERT, CERT-SE (Sweden), as required for your jurisdiction.
  • Monitor for the data appearing on IMNCrew's leak site and across paste and breach channels, and brief downstream partners who may be exposed through you.

How we know this. Darkfield monitors public ransomware leak sites continuously, archiving every new disclosure and the data later released against the victim. Each entry on this page is sourced from the operator's own publication and cross-checked against complementary OSINT feeds (RansomLook, ransomware.live, RansomWatch). We do not collect or host stolen data — only the metadata, timestamps and screenshots needed to make the public disclosure searchable and accountable. Records here are corrected when the original post is edited, retracted, or merged with another disclosure.