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Egyptian Airports Company (EAC)

listed as www.eac-airports.com · Claimed by Krybit · listed 22 hours ago

Today
Age
since listed · data leaked

Status timeline

  1. ListedSep 12, 2026
  2. Data leakeddate unknown

At a glance

Group
Krybit
Status
Data leaked
Country
Kenya
Sector
Transportation
Listed on leak site
Sep 12, 2026

About the victim

AI dossier — public-source company profile

Egyptian Airports Company (EAC) is a state-owned subsidiary of EHCAAN operating 19 regional airports across Egypt under the Ministry of Civil Aviation. The company manages major airports serving tourist destinations and handles approximately 60% of total Egyptian air traffic.

Industry
Airport Operations & Management
Address
In Front of the Ministry of Civil Aviation, Airport Road, Cairo, Egypt
Founded
2001

Attack summary

Severity: low — No proof files, screenshots, or data samples are advertised in the leak post. No operational disruption or specific data exfiltration is described. Post contains only corporate background information.

Krybit claims to have conducted an attack on EAC; the leak post provides company background information but does not explicitly describe what data was exfiltrated, encrypted, or what specific attack actions were taken.

low

What the group claims

Egyptian Airports Company (EAC) is an Egyptian state-owned public company incorporated in 2001, operating as a subsidiar...

The leak post

captured from the group's site
Egyptian Airports Company (EAC) is an Egyptian state-owned public company incorporated in 2001, operating as a subsidiary of EHCAAN (Egyptian Holding Company for Airports and Air Navigation), under the supervision of the Egyptian Ministry of Civil Aviation. EAC is responsible for managing, operating, and developing 19 regional airports across Egypt, hosting 60% of the total air traffic in the country. The company's airports serve Egypt's major tourist destinations across the Red Sea, North Coast, and Nile Valley regions. Key principal is Adel Abd El Aziz Mahgoub.
HQ: In Front of the Ministry of Civil Aviation, Airport Road, Cairo, Egypt
Type: State-owned public company (subsidiary of EHCAAN)
Parent Company: EHCAAN (Egyptian Holding Company for Airports and Air Navigation)
Supervising Ministry: Ministry of Civil Aviation, Egypt
Airports Managed (19): Sharm El Sheikh, Hurghada, Luxor, Aswan, Alexandria (Borg El Arab), Taba, Abu Simbel, Sohag, Assiut, Capital International Airport (New Administrative Capital), and others
Air Traffic Share: 60% of total Egyptian air traffic
Revenue: not publicly disclosed (state-owned enterprise)

Sources

Source

Indexed 22 hours ago

This page surfaces a public ransomware disclosure indexed by Darkfield. Original posts come from the operator's own leak site; we cross-check against ransomware.live, RansomLook and RansomWatch where applicable. Share this URL freely.

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Disclosure context

About krybit

Krybit is an emerging ransomware group that was first observed in April 2026, operating with apparent financial motivations based on their limited documented attacks against diverse sectors. The group's origin and affiliations remain unclear due to limited public intelligence, and it is unknown whether they operate as a Ransomware-as-a-Service model or as an independent entity. With only four known victims documented across geographically diverse regions including Mexico, Austria, Japan, and Botswana, the group appears to employ broad targeting rather than focused regional or sector-specific campaigns, though their attack methodology, encryption techniques, and data exfiltration practices have not been publicly documented by major security firms or law enforcement agencies. No notable high-profile campaigns or significant ransoms have been publicly reported, and no law enforcement actions against the group have been documented. Given the recent emergence of this group and extremely limited public reporting, Krybit's current operational status and capabilities remain largely unknown to the broader cybersecurity community. The group has been linked to 146 public disclosures across our corpus. First observed on a leak site on April 3, 2026; most recent post September 12, 2026. The operation is currently active.

Timeline of this disclosure

  • September 12, 2026www.eac-airports.com listed by krybit on the group's public leak site

Other recent disclosures by krybit

krybit has been linked to 146 public victims on Darkfield. A sample of the most recent:

See the full krybit dossier →

Sector and geography

This disclosure adds to ransomware activity in the Transportation sector, which has 47 disclosures indexed across all operators we track. Geographically, www.eac-airports.com is reported in Kenya, a country with 2 ransomware disclosures in our corpus.

If your organisation is affected

A listing by krybit means www.eac-airports.com appeared on a ransomware extortion site and data attributed to it has been published. If this is your organisation, or a supplier you depend on, the priority is to confirm the intrusion and contain it before the window to act closes.

  • Engage your incident-response team and preserve forensic evidence before remediating — do not wipe affected systems first.
  • Force a password reset and revoke active sessions for exposed accounts; rotate any credentials, API keys or certificates that may have been in the stolen data.
  • Assess regulatory notification duties (GDPR, NIS2, sector regulators) — many carry a 72-hour reporting clock from awareness.
  • Monitor for the data appearing on krybit's leak site and across paste and breach channels, and brief downstream partners who may be exposed through you.

How we know this. Darkfield monitors public ransomware leak sites continuously, archiving every new disclosure and the data later released against the victim. Each entry on this page is sourced from the operator's own publication and cross-checked against complementary OSINT feeds (RansomLook, ransomware.live, RansomWatch). We do not collect or host stolen data — only the metadata, timestamps and screenshots needed to make the public disclosure searchable and accountable. Records here are corrected when the original post is edited, retracted, or merged with another disclosure.