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Ransomware victim disclosure

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ACA Pescara S.p.A.

listed as ACA Pescara · Claimed by Thegentlemen · listed 20 hours ago

Today
Age
since listed · data leaked

Status timeline

  1. ListedSep 15, 2026
  2. Data leakeddate unknown

At a glance

Status
Data leaked
Country
Italy
Listed on leak site
Sep 15, 2026

About the victim

AI dossier — public-source company profile

ACA Pescara S.p.A. is a public utility company (ente pubblico economico) operating under Abruzzo regional law, owned by the Province of Pescara and its member municipalities. It manages integrated water services including supply, sewerage, billing, maintenance, and technical support for the Pescara province. The company operates public service infrastructure and customer support across residential and commercial users.

Industry
Public Water & Utilities Management
Address
Pescara, Abruzzo, Italy
Employees
20-60

Attack summary

Severity: low — No proof files, screenshots, or data samples are advertised; no operational disruption is claimed; no data categories are specified in the disclosure. This appears to be a listing/announcement only with minimal substantiation.

The threat actor claims to have accessed ACA Pescara's systems and published data. The leak post provides no detail on the attack method (encryption vs. exfiltration only) or specific data categories compromised, stating only '(none)' for data size.

low

What the group claims

aca.pescara.it zoominfo.com/c/aca-spa-in-house-providing/458761917 ACA Pescara public housing agency of the Province of Pescara (Abruzzo, Italy) — an ente pubblico economico created under Abruzzo's regional housing law (LR 39/1989, successor to the old IACP public-housing institutes), owned by the province and member municipalities. Its job: building, allocating and managing public/social housing (ERP) — social-rent apartments allocated by points system (family size, income, disability, eviction risk), below-market "canone moderato" housing, and residences for elderly and disabled residents. Typical ACA functions include rent collection, maintenance, public tenders/PPPs with developers, and post-earthquake reconstruction programs (a core Abruzzo role after L'Aquila 2009 and Amatrice 2016). It's a small regional body (~20–60 staff, minimal digital footprint, no public financials) — the kind of quiet public utility that runs the invisible housing layer of a mid-sized Italian province.

Sources

Source

Indexed 20 hours ago

This page surfaces a public ransomware disclosure indexed by Darkfield. Original posts come from the operator's own leak site; we cross-check against ransomware.live, RansomLook and RansomWatch where applicable. Share this URL freely.

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Disclosure context

About thegentlemen

thegentlemen is a ransomware group that emerged in September 2025, operating with apparent financial motivations based on their broad targeting of commercial sectors. The group has documented 267 victims across multiple countries, with primary focus on the United States, Thailand, France, Brazil, and India. Their targeting strategy demonstrates a preference for high-value sectors including manufacturing, technology, healthcare, and financial services organizations. Given the group's recent emergence and limited public documentation from established threat intelligence sources such as CISA, FBI, or major security research firms, specific details regarding their country of origin, operational structure, attack methodologies, encryption techniques, and whether they employ ransomware-as-a-service models remain unclear. The relatively high victim count of 267 in a short operational timeframe since September 2025 suggests either an aggressive campaign pace or potential inflation of victim numbers through affiliate operations, though without corroborating intelligence reports, the group's exact operational capabilities and notable campaigns cannot be definitively established. Current intelligence indicates the group remains active as of late 2025, though comprehensive threat profiling requires additional validated reporting from authoritative cybersecurity sources. The group has been linked to 868 public disclosures across our corpus. First observed on a leak site on September 9, 2025; most recent post September 15, 2026. The operation is currently active.

Also tracked as: the gentlemen.

Timeline of this disclosure

  • September 15, 2026ACA Pescara listed by thegentlemen on the group's public leak site

Sector and geography

This disclosure adds to ransomware activity in the Energy & Utilities sector, which has 169 disclosures indexed across all operators we track. Geographically, ACA Pescara is reported in Italy, a country with 203 ransomware disclosures in our corpus.

If your organisation is affected

A listing by thegentlemen means ACA Pescara appeared on a ransomware extortion site and data attributed to it has been published. If this is your organisation, or a supplier you depend on, the priority is to confirm the intrusion and contain it before the window to act closes.

  • Engage your incident-response team and preserve forensic evidence before remediating — do not wipe affected systems first.
  • Force a password reset and revoke active sessions for exposed accounts; rotate any credentials, API keys or certificates that may have been in the stolen data.
  • Assess regulatory notification duties (GDPR, NIS2, sector regulators) — many carry a 72-hour reporting clock from awareness.
  • Report the incident to your national CERT, CSIRT Italia (Italy), as required for your jurisdiction.
  • Monitor for the data appearing on thegentlemen's leak site and across paste and breach channels, and brief downstream partners who may be exposed through you.

How we know this. Darkfield monitors public ransomware leak sites continuously, archiving every new disclosure and the data later released against the victim. Each entry on this page is sourced from the operator's own publication and cross-checked against complementary OSINT feeds (RansomLook, ransomware.live, RansomWatch). We do not collect or host stolen data — only the metadata, timestamps and screenshots needed to make the public disclosure searchable and accountable. Records here are corrected when the original post is edited, retracted, or merged with another disclosure.