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VictimsDDC Domus Design Collection

DDC Domus Design Collection

claimed by AkiraConsumer Servicescritical · Confirmed exfiltration of regulated PII at s…
What this is

A claim by the operator that it has published the data.

No statement from the organisation is on record here. We index the listing; we never host the data.

Corroboration
not recorded

This row predates provenance tracking; the next feed run will stamp it.

Timeline
  1. Listed · Jun 12, 2026
  2. Data published · date unknown: the post does not say
Leak-post captureJun 12, 2026post text missingscreenshot missingverified missing
No screenshot on file. This row comes from a tracker listing; our crawler has not captured the page yet.
PostPost URL not recorded for this row.
What the operator wrote
Founded in 1991 and headquartered in New York City, New York, DDC Domus Design Collection is a company that manufactures as well as sell furniture items. We will upload 55gb of corporate data soon. Detailed financials, employee personal information (passports, addresses, phones, emails and so on), credit cards information, projects, clients i nfo, etc.

From the feed's summary of the post; we hold no capture of our own yet.

Size claimed
unknown
the post states no size
Records claimed
unknown
the post states no count
Ransom · deadline
not stated
we show unknown, never zero
Data the operator says was taken
financial recordsemployee personal information (passports, addresses, phones, emails)credit card informationproject dataclient information

Extracted from the post text by the enrichment model; each item traces to a sentence in the capture.

Attack summary

The akira group claims to have exfiltrated approximately 55 GB of corporate data including detailed financials, employee personal information (passports, addresses, contact details), credit card information, projects, and client information. The group states they will upload this data.

Severity critical: Confirmed exfiltration of regulated PII at scale (employee passports, addresses, contact details), financial records, and payment card data. The 55 GB volume and diversity of sensitive data types indicates significant organizational exposure.

If this is your organisation
  1. Assume credentials were taken even where the post names none: reset, revoke sessions, enforce a second factor.
  2. Open the incident with your national CERT and your regulator before data is published, not after.
  3. Watch the listing: a tracked domain is re-checked against every new post and you are paged when this one changes status or another operator names the organisation.

Method: the row comes from the operator's post, listed by an independent tracker and checked against our own Tor capture of the leak site. We publish the listing, the screenshot and the claim text; we do not download, host or redistribute leaked data. A post that changes is re-captured and this page updates.

Updated 4 months ago

Disclosure context

About Akira

Akira is a ransomware group that emerged in April 2023, operating with primarily financial motivations and has rapidly established itself as a significant threat actor with over 1,500 documented victims. The group's country of origin remains unclear, though they operate as a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model, recruiting affiliates to conduct attacks while the core group maintains the ransomware infrastructure and negotiation processes. Akira employs multi-faceted attack methodologies including exploitation of VPN vulnerabilities, particularly targeting Cisco VPN appliances, and utilizes living-off-the-land techniques along with legitimate administrative tools to avoid detection, while implementing double extortion tactics by exfiltrating sensitive data before deploying their encryption payload. The group has demonstrated a preference for targeting organizations in the United States, Canada, Germany, United Kingdom, and Italy, with a particular focus on manufacturing, business services, technology, and construction sectors, though they have shown willingness to attack various industries. Despite being relatively new to the ransomware landscape, Akira has maintained consistent operations throughout 2023 and into 2024, with law enforcement agencies including CISA and FBI issuing advisories about their activities, though no major disruption operations have been publicly reported against the group as of late 2024. The group has been linked to 1,770 public disclosures across our corpus. First observed on a leak site on April 26, 2023; most recent post October 14, 2026. The operation is currently active.

Also tracked as: Megazord.

Timeline of this disclosure

  • June 12, 2026DDC Domus Design Collection listed by Akira on the group's public leak site

Sector and geography

This disclosure adds to ransomware activity in the Consumer Services sector, which has 832 disclosures indexed across all operators we track.

If your organisation is affected

A listing by Akira means DDC Domus Design Collection appeared on a ransomware extortion site and data attributed to it has been published. If this is your organisation, or a supplier you depend on, the priority is to confirm the intrusion and contain it before the window to act closes.

  • Engage your incident-response team and preserve forensic evidence before remediating — do not wipe affected systems first.
  • Force a password reset and revoke active sessions for exposed accounts; rotate any credentials, API keys or certificates that may have been in the stolen data.
  • Assess regulatory notification duties (GDPR, NIS2, sector regulators) — many carry a 72-hour reporting clock from awareness.
  • Monitor for the data appearing on Akira's leak site and across paste and breach channels, and brief downstream partners who may be exposed through you.

How we know this. Darkfield monitors public ransomware leak sites continuously, recording every new disclosure and the moment the operator says the data was released. Each entry on this page is sourced from the operator's own publication, listed by an independent tracker (RansomLook) and checked against our own capture. We do not collect or host stolen data — only the metadata, timestamps and screenshots needed to make the public disclosure searchable and accountable. Records here are corrected when the original post is edited, retracted, or merged with another disclosure.