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Ransomware victim disclosure

All victims

GS Yuasa Lithium Power

Claimed by Akira · listed 3 months ago

2m
Age
since listed · data leaked

Status timeline

  1. ListedMay 28, 2026
  2. Data leakeddate unknown

At a glance

Group
Akira
Status
Data leaked
Country
Japan
Listed on leak site
May 28, 2026

About the victim

AI dossier — public-source company profile

GS Yuasa Lithium Power is a North American manufacturer of advanced lithium-ion battery cells and systems serving aerospace, military, industrial, and specialty markets. Their products are used in space applications (satellites, rockets), undersea technologies, and military systems, backed by decades of R&D and field-proven reliability.

Industry
Advanced Battery Manufacturing & Systems (Aerospace, Defense, Industrial)
Address
1150 Northmeadow Parkway, Suite 110, Roswell, GA 30076-3886

Attack summary

Severity: critical — Exfiltration of aerospace/defense-sensitive data (Boeing satellite projects, military/industrial specifications, client information, NDAs) from a company serving space and military markets represents significant national security and commercial sensitivity. Data has been confirmed as published by the group.

The AKIRA group claims to have exfiltrated corporate data including project files related to Boeing satellite contracts, technical drawings, specifications, client information, NDAs, and agreements. The group states they will upload the data soon.

critical

Data the group says was taken

AI dossier — extracted from the leak post
  • project data (Boeing satellite)
  • contracts and agreements
  • technical drawings and specifications
  • client information
  • NDA documents

What the group claims

GS Yuasa Lithium Power specializes in advanced batteries and battery systems, primarily serving clients in the Aerospace, Industrial, Military, and Specialty markets across North America. Wi th decades of research and development, their lithium-ion cells are known for proven performanc e and reliability, particularly in demanding applications such as satellites and undersea techn ologies. We will upload corporate data soon. Lots of project data (BOEING satellite and other interestin g directories), contracts and agreements, lots of drawings and specifications, clients info, ND A, etc.

Sources

Source

Indexed 3 months ago

This page surfaces a public ransomware disclosure indexed by Darkfield. Original posts come from the operator's own leak site; we cross-check against ransomware.live, RansomLook and RansomWatch where applicable. Share this URL freely.

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Disclosure context

About Akira

Akira is a ransomware group that emerged in April 2023, operating with primarily financial motivations and has rapidly established itself as a significant threat actor with over 1,500 documented victims. The group's country of origin remains unclear, though they operate as a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model, recruiting affiliates to conduct attacks while the core group maintains the ransomware infrastructure and negotiation processes. Akira employs multi-faceted attack methodologies including exploitation of VPN vulnerabilities, particularly targeting Cisco VPN appliances, and utilizes living-off-the-land techniques along with legitimate administrative tools to avoid detection, while implementing double extortion tactics by exfiltrating sensitive data before deploying their encryption payload. The group has demonstrated a preference for targeting organizations in the United States, Canada, Germany, United Kingdom, and Italy, with a particular focus on manufacturing, business services, technology, and construction sectors, though they have shown willingness to attack various industries. Despite being relatively new to the ransomware landscape, Akira has maintained consistent operations throughout 2023 and into 2024, with law enforcement agencies including CISA and FBI issuing advisories about their activities, though no major disruption operations have been publicly reported against the group as of late 2024. The group has been linked to 1,704 public disclosures across our corpus. First observed on a leak site on April 26, 2023; most recent post August 25, 2026. The operation is currently active.

Also tracked as: Megazord.

Timeline of this disclosure

  • May 28, 2026GS Yuasa Lithium Power listed by Akiraon the group's public leak site

Sector and geography

This disclosure adds to ransomware activity in the Manufacturing sector, which has 3,692 disclosures indexed across all operators we track. Geographically, GS Yuasa Lithium Power is reported in Japan, a country with 89 ransomware disclosures in our corpus.

If your organisation is affected

A listing by Akira means GS Yuasa Lithium Power appeared on a ransomware extortion site and data attributed to it has been published. If this is your organisation, or a supplier you depend on, the priority is to confirm the intrusion and contain it before the window to act closes.

  • Engage your incident-response team and preserve forensic evidence before remediating — do not wipe affected systems first.
  • Force a password reset and revoke active sessions for exposed accounts; rotate any credentials, API keys or certificates that may have been in the stolen data.
  • Assess regulatory notification duties (GDPR, NIS2, sector regulators) — many carry a 72-hour reporting clock from awareness.
  • Report the incident to your national CERT, JPCERT/CC (Japan), as required for your jurisdiction.
  • Monitor for the data appearing on Akira's leak site and across paste and breach channels, and brief downstream partners who may be exposed through you.

How we know this. Darkfield monitors public ransomware leak sites continuously, archiving every new disclosure and the data later released against the victim. Each entry on this page is sourced from the operator's own publication and cross-checked against complementary OSINT feeds (RansomLook, ransomware.live, RansomWatch). We do not collect or host stolen data — only the metadata, timestamps and screenshots needed to make the public disclosure searchable and accountable. Records here are corrected when the original post is edited, retracted, or merged with another disclosure.